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LEARNING FROM MARKET FEEDBACK: EVIDENCE FROM
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
Anjana Rajamani, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
Targets of merger deals experience significant value increases in the days leading up to
the announcement of a deal. Existing literature attributes the runup in target value solely
to deal anticipation and, as such, the runup is regarded as being uninformative about
the surplus that can be generated from the deal. I find empirical evidence that target
runup is positively related to bidder gain and to deal completion probability and that
these results are strongest when the level of uncertainty regarding deal surplus is high.
The results suggest that target runup reflects the market consensus about the deal surplus
and that this independent outside signal of deal surplus allows bidder insiders to update
their priors and improve their decision making in regards to the deal. These results add to
our understanding of managerial learning from the market and the role of the market in
determining the outcome of privately negotiated deals.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Imagine a firm (the bidder) that is in private negotiations to acquire another firm (the
target). During the negotiation period the market value of the target firm increases. How
does the increase in the target value impact the premium it receives in the deal? The target
management would most likely make the case that its stand-alone value has increased and
demand an equivalent premium on the now higher base value. The bidder would likely
counter this argument by making the case that the increase in target value is a result of
deal anticipation by the market. The price offered for the target ultimately depends upon
the relative persuasion powers of the parties involved in the deal. Existing empirical work
is focused on the issue of deal anticipation and examines whether the target runup adds
to the cost of the deal for the bidder (see for example, Schwert (1996), Betton, Eckbo,
Thompson and Thornburn (2011)). In this paper I examine the possibility that target
runup provides an independent outside signal of deal surplus, and that it benefits the bid-
der by improving the precision of the bidder insider’s private signal.
There is a well established stream of literature which argues that rational agents can
learn from outsiders (market participants) regarding the value of an investment or even
the prospects of their own firm. In theoretical models by Dow and Gorton (1997) and
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) stock prices are informative because they aggregate
information from many different participants who do not have channels for communication
with the firm outside the trading process (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007)). Per these
1
models, stock prices may contain some information that managers do not have.1 Rational
agents could hence use such market feedback to update their priors regarding different in-
vestment propositions. In the case of mergers, insiders of the bidding firm could potentially
use the market feedback to evaluate the fair value/remium that a target should receive in
a deal.
In the context of mergers, the pre-announcement change in the value of the target
can potentially be viewed as market feedback on the value of the expected surplus from
the deal. With managerial learning such market feedback would result in an updating of
the priors of the insiders that could influence their decisions in regards to the deal. In
this paper, I investigate whether the target runup has the potential to be beneficial to
the bidder by providing usable feedback. Specifically, I address the following questions:
(1) Does target runup contain information about the surplus that can be generated from
the deal? (2) How does target runup impact the bidder’s outcome from the deal? (3) If
target runup is informative, do managers use this information in guiding their investment
decisions, specifically in regards to deal selection and payment?
I find empirical evidence that deals that generate a larger surplus from the combination
of the bidder and the target, on average see larger runup in the target value prior to deal
announcement. In other words, a larger target runup is a signal of a deal which would gen-
erate a bigger surplus. Further, the runup represents a larger fraction of the total target
premium in high surplus deals. This result suggests that the target runup closely reflects
the expected surplus from the deal especially when the potential surplus is large.
The runup in the value of the target does not however increase the cost of the deal
1Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007, p.620): “This information is more likely to be about the demand for
the firm’s products or about strategic issues, such as competition with other firms. It is less likely to be
about the technology used by the firm, because the manager is expected to have an informational advantage
about technological factors.”
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to the bidder: I document a positive relation between target runup and the bidder’s deal-
related gain. I hypothesize that the target runup is beneficial to the bidder stockholders
because it provides an independent outside estimate of the surplus that can be generated
from the deal, thereby enabling the bidder insiders to update their priors and make better
decisions about deal selection and pricing. I further hypothesize that a larger target runup
is more valuable because it is a less noisy signal of deal surplus.
To test the managerial learning hypothesis, I examine the impact of target runup on
bidder gain in scenarios that differ in the level of uncertainty about deal surplus. If the
target runup serves as an outside signal of deal surplus for the bidder insiders, then it
should have a larger impact on the bidder gain in high uncertainty scenarios because there
is a greater potential for misestimation of the deal surplus in such cases. I use 5 differ-
ent measures to capture the uncertainty regarding the deal surplus: (i) mode of payment
(cash vs. stock), (ii) target idiosyncratic volatility, (iii) target B/M, (iv) target technology
intensity and (v) industry relatedness of the bidder and the target. I interact the target
runup with each of the uncertainty measures and find that it has a larger impact on the
bidder gain in deals where the level of uncertainty is high.
I further document that the unanticipated premium (i.e., the difference between the
offer price and the end of runup period price of the target) is significantly smaller in deals
with greater levels of uncertainty. This suggests that managers more closely benchmark
their offer price against the end of runup period price when they are less certain about
value, which is consistent with the notion of managerial learning.
To test whether a larger target runup is a less noisy signal, I examine its relation to the
change in bidder uncertainty around deal announcement. The change in bidder uncertainty
around deal announcement should be related to the uncertainty regarding deal surplus. If
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a larger target runup is indicative of a greater level of certainty about deal surplus, then it
should be negatively related to the bidder uncertainty change around deal announcement.
Using the implied volatility on the bidder stock to capture the change in its uncertainty, I
document a negative relation with target runup, which is consistent with my hypothesis.
Finally, I find evidence that the target runup has a positive impact on deal completion
probability in scenarios where there is a greater level of uncertainty. This suggests that
the target runup impacts the deal selection decision by managers and that they treat the
market feedback as information that is complementary to their own when faced with a high
level of uncertainty.
This paper contributes to the existing mergers and acquisitions literature in three ways:
first, by shedding light on the nature of information contained in target runup, it lays out
an alternative channel through which the target runup can impact the bidder’s outcome
from a deal. Academics and practitioners alike view target runup as having an adverse
impact on the bidder in an acquisition. Schwert (1996) describes the existence of markup
pricing in mergers, wherein the pre-announcement increase in the target value adds to the
cost of the deal for the bidder. However, the existence of markup pricing goes against
the dominantly observed outcome that targets of most completed deals see a substantial
runup in their value. By acknowledging the role of the market in influencing the precision
of the insiders’ private signal and hence managerial action, this paper provides a ratio-
nal explanation for this dominant outcome. Second, it adds to our understanding of the
role of financial markets in improving the outcome of privately negotiated deals. Absent
any uncertainty regarding value, incentives will naturally guide managers toward the value
maximizing outcome. However, when the manager is uncertain about the value of the
investment proposition (acquisition), market feedback (in the form of target runup) helps
improve the precision of his estimate and thereby reduces the likelihood of overpayment.
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Finally, the results of this paper highlight some important measurement issues in the
way deal synergy/surplus is measured in the current literature. Traditionally, the syn-
ergy/surplus from a deal is measured as the weighted sum of the target and the bidder ab-
normal return in a small window surrounding announcement. The underlying assumption
is that the pre-announcement window is uninformative, thus ignoring the price movements
in the window will not bias the estimates of synergy in any systematic way. The results
of this paper suggest that this may not be the case. Deals that generate a larger surplus
are anticipated to a greater degree. Hence by ignoring the pre-announcement window in
the estimation of deal surplus, we may be underestimating the surplus of those deals that
truly have a large surplus.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the
existing literature. Section 3 discusses potential sources of target runup and the channels
through which it can impact the bidder’s outcome from a deal. Section 4 lists the empirical




Channels of information leakage prior to major corporate events, especially mergers and
acquisitions, have been studied extensively. Barclay and Warner (1993) and Schwert (1996)
find that the target runup represents between 50 and 57 percent of the total premium paid
for the targets in mergers. Deal anticipation, and hence the target runup, has been at-
tributed to actions of insiders (Meulbroek (1992), Schwert (1996)), hedging of credit risk
exposure by investment banks underwriting debt/equity issues made by the acquiring firms
(Acharya and Johnson (2007, 2010), Bodnaruk and Massa (2009)) and unexpected option
grants to CEOs (Fich, Cai and Tran (2011)). Ahern and Sosyura (2012) find that bidders
of stock financed deals originate substantially more news stories after the start of merger
negotiations but before the public announcement. Jayaraman, Frye and Sabherwal (2001)
document a significant increase in the volume of traded options (Put and Call) in firms
involved in merger negotiations, suggesting that the pre-announcement period sees height-
ened activity by informed/sophisticated investors who are actively engaged in collecting
private information.1
Schwert (1996) is the first to address the question of how such information leakage and
the resulting runup in the value of the target impacts the offer price it receives from the
bidder. Schwert argues that if target runup is driven by deal anticipation, then it should
1Jayaraman et al. (2001), Ni, Pan and Poteshman (2008) find that the option market leads the stock
market in information production, which is consistent with greater participation of informed investors in
the options market.
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substitute for the market response to the deal at announcement. Hence, a linear projec-
tion of the target announcement return on its runup should have a slope of -1. However,
if target runup results in “markup pricing”, in which there is a dollar-for-dollar increase
in the offer price for the target, then the target announcement return and its runup will
be unrelated (slope coefficient of zero). Empirically, Schwert finds that the target an-
nouncement return and its runup are unrelated. Hence, he rejects the deal anticipation
hypothesis and concludes that markup pricing exists and that target runup is costly for
bidders. With markup pricing the bidders partially incur the costs of information pro-
duction by the informed market participants who invest in the targets prior to the deal
announcement (Brigida and Madura (2012)).
Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, and Thornburn (2011), however, argue that if the runup
adds to the bidder’s cost, the projection of markup (offer price minus target price just
prior to announcement) on runup should yield a strictly positive slope (and not zero as
previously thought). The authors construct a model which allows for the target runup
to reflect the updated probability of the bid (deal anticipation), as well as the expected
surplus that can be generated from the deal. According to the model, the relation between
markup and runup will be nonlinear when the runup is driven by market anticipation of
the expected premium and, hence, the projection of markup on runup will yield a slope
coefficient greater than -1. Under this framework, the empirical evidence found by Schwert
(1996) – namely, the lack of perfect substitution between runup and markup – is consistent
with the deal anticipation hypothesis.2
In related work, Cornett, Tanyeri and Tehranian (2011) point to issues in the way deal
outcomes are measured. They find that investors can more successfully predict bidder firms
2Another prediction of the model by Betton et al. (2011) is that bidder takeover gains will be increasing
in target runup. They present some empirical evidence in this regard. I take the results further by relating
the value of information in target runup to the degree of uncertainty about the target/deal value.
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than target firms. The asymmetry in the anticipation of bidder and target firms causes
disparity in the announcement return of the parties. After accounting for the predictability
of the bidder firms they find a significant decline in the difference between the bidder and
target announcement return. There is however no clear evidence on how the target runup
impacts the bidder’s outcome from the deal.
While Schwert (1996) and Betton et al.(2011) focus on the costly feedback effects of
target runup, I argue that the target runup could be potentially beneficial to the bidder.
If the target runup is informative about the deal surplus, the bidder management can use
the target runup to update their priors regarding the deal. The notion of learning from
the market is an important underpinning of the efficient market hypothesis, according
to which the market’s assessment of value is superior to that of any individual or group
of investors. If markets are informationally efficient they can contribute to the efficient
allocation of investments. Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2011) discuss the real effects of
financial markets in the context of mergers:
“Consider, for example, a firm manager, who is arguably the individual most in-
formed about the firm’s fundamentals. The manager announces an acquisition bid
for another firm. This decision is often made after undertaking substantial internal
analysis and seeking the external counsel of investment banks, to assess whether the
value of the target to the acquirer exceeds the offer price. As is well known, this
assessment is based on assumptions with a high degree of uncertainty. In particu-
lar, the desirability of the deal depends on many factors other than the acquirer’s
fundamentals and about which the acquirer may be less than fully informed –such as
the stand-alone value of the target,the likely synergies between the acquirer and the
target,and the future prospects of the industry (which affects whether it is optimal for
the acquirer to expand via acquisition).Hence, it is entirely plausible that, among the
many speculators who trade in the stock market, some have insight into the proposed
deal that are missed by the manager and his advisors. If participants trade on this
information, their insights will be reflected in the price. Hence, when a manager an-
nounces an acquisition and the market responds negatively, he may learn from this
response and cancel the deal.”
(Bond et al., 2011: 4)
The assumption that stock market participants have information about some aspects
of the firm which is not available to the firm’s managers is also made in papers by Dow and
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Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999, 2001), Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), Dow
and Rahi (2003), Goldstein and Guembel (2008), Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2010),and
Bond, Goldstein and Prescott (2010). Bond et. al. (2010) provide a theoretical analysis
of situations in which managers learn from the markets and show that market information
and agents’ information are complementary.
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), Luo (2005) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007)
provide empirical evidence that managers learn from the market response while making
investment decisions. In the context of mergers, Luo (2005) finds a positive correlation
between the bidder’s announcement return and the completion of mergers. He attributes
this to insiders’ learning from outsiders. Chen et al. (2007) examine the impact of private
information in stock prices on investments. They find that even after directly controlling
for the amount of managerial information, the amount of private information in the stock
price has a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price,
suggesting that managers learn from the market.
In the context of this paper, the target runup can be viewed as the consensus estimate
of the market participants regarding the expected deal surplus. In the following sections I
describe the sources of runup in target value and the potential channels through which it
can impact the bidder.
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3.0 SOURCES OF TARGET RUNUP AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE
BIDDER GAIN
3.1 DEAL ANTICIPATION AND TARGET RUNUP
Consider a target firm which is in negotiations with a potential bidder to be acquired. If the
market anticipates the impending takeover announcement, then the change in the target
market value during the pre-announcement period can come from two sources: (1) increase
in the stand-alone value of the target and (2) target’s expected share of any synergies that
can be generated from the deal. The increase in target stand-alone value represents any
value that can be created by replacing the target management or correction of any potential
under-valuation of the target. Increase in the target stand-alone value and synergy gain
are hence the two components of the total surplus that can be generated from a deal. The
target runup can thus be characterized as follows:
Target Runup = ∆VT + θMkt ∗ γ ∗ pc (3.1)
where,
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∆VT is the change in the stand-alone value of the target. Unconditionally,
we would expect the target to be fairly valued and hence the expected
change in the target stand-alone value is zero (E(∆VT ) = 0). However,
to the extent that the bidder is trying to exploit an undervaluation
of the target’s assets (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006)),
the anticipation of the impending deal could result in the correction
of any potential undervaluation of the target. An alternative source
of change in target stand-alone value is the benefit from replacing the
target management or from the current target management committing
to undertake some value increasing measures as a result of a takeover
threat.
θMkt is the market’s estimate of the synergy gains from the combination of
the bidder and the target.
γ > 0 is the market’s estimate of the target’s share of the deal surplus.
pc is the market’s estimate of the likelihood that the deal will be successfully
completed. We would expect pc to be increasing in deal surplus.
How are rumors about impending bids priced-in to the target? Arguably, the extent
to which deal related rumors get translated into active trading/purchases in the target
depends upon the perceived likelihood of completion of the proposed deal, which in itself is
a function of the market’s estimate of the potential surplus from the deal. In other words,
market participants are more likely to price in deal-related rumors by active purchases in
the target when the expected surplus/benefit from the deal is high since they attribute a
larger likelihood of completion to such deals. Given the large expected premium for the
target in deals with a large surplus, any market participant aware of the impending deal
would try to accumulate as much of the target stock as possible. Such increased interest
in the target stock would result in an increase in the anticipation of the deal by a larger
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section of the market. Thus, it is less likely that deals with a large surplus are anticipated
by only a few market participants for a prolonged period of time.1
Therefore, larger the potential surplus from a deal, greater the likelihood that active
trading by market participants causes a runup in target value. Under such a framework,
the target runup is systematically related to deal surplus: deals with a higher expected sur-
plus are anticipated to a greater degree and hence associated with a larger runup in target
value. The difference in target runup in the cross-section is thus related to the difference in
deal surplus and is not merely the result of difference in the degree of anticipation. Hence,
the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Target runup reflects the market’s estimate of potential deal
surplus.
If the target runup is informative about the deal surplus (i.e., increase in stand-alone
value plus synergy gain) that can be generated from a deal then we would expect it to be
positively related to deal surplus (measured as the combined wealth effect of the bidder
and the target). If, instead, the target runup is due to an increase in the target stand-alone
value resulting from exogenous reasons (i.e., unrelated to potential gains that can be made
by replacing the target management) we would not expect to see the same positive relation
between the target runup and the deal surplus. This is so because compensating the target
for such exogenous increases in value would simply result in a transfer of wealth from the
bidder to the target. For example, consider a deal with no significant surplus. However,
merger rumors cause a runup in the target value. If the bidder chooses to proceed with
such a deal, it would experience a decline in its market value upon announcement, which
is commensurate to the overpayment for the target. The combined wealth effect of the
bidder and target in this case is zero. The target runup in such a scenario will thus be
1I will examine the validity of this assumption empirically in Section 5.2.
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unrelated to the deal surplus.
If the target runup reflects information about the deal surplus and the bidder manage-
ment uses this information to make better deal-related decisions, then the target runup
could potentially have a positive impact on the bidder’s deal-related gain. I develop this
idea in the following subsection.
3.2 MANAGERIAL LEARNING FROM TARGET RUNUP
Consider a manager who is contemplating a bid for a target firm. His only prior regarding
the deal is that the expected increase in cashflow from the deal is in the range [l, h]. Let
the true deal surplus be θ0 which lies in the range [l, h]. The potential for misestimation
of deal value by the manager increases in the degree of uncertainty regarding deal surplus,
i.e., the greater the distance (h− l). Thus, the greater the manager’s uncertainty regarding
deal surplus the more he can potentially benefit from an outside signal of deal surplus.
From the previous section we note that the target runup is expected to increase with the
market’s estimate of deal surplus. A deal with higher potential surplus will attract more
market interest, resulting in a target runup that more closely estimates the total expected
premium for the target. A smaller runup in target value is a weaker signal of deal surplus:
since deal-related rumors are less likely to be translated into active trading/anticipation
by market participants when the potential surplus is low, the target price is less likely to
reflect the fair value of the expected premium and hence the expected surplus in such cases.
Thus, while the target runup can serve as an outside signal of deal surplus, it is more
noisy, and therefore less beneficial, when the magnitude of the runup is small. Therefore,
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a larger target runup is expected to be associated with better bidder decisions, leading to
a higher bidder gain. Improved decision-making can take at least two forms.
1. Better deal selection: Learning enables managers to walk away from potentially low
surplus/value-destroying deals and to only complete deals with a large surplus, and
2. Reduction in the likelihood of overpayment: Managers can update their priors regarding
the expected surplus from the deal and adjust the payment for the target accordingly,
thereby lowering the likelihood that they overpay.
Hence, the bidder gain from the deal should be positively related to the target runup.
This leads us to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Target runup has a positive impact on the bidder’s deal-related
gain.
However, as discussed in earlier sections, to the extent that the target runup is due
to exogenous factors unrelated to the potential surplus, the bidder gain will be negatively
related to the target runup and will bias us against our null in hypothesis 2. An important
implication of managerial learning is that the extent to which the target runup impacts
the bidder’s deal-related gain should be related to the level of uncertainty – the target
runup should be more valuable for the bidder stockholders when the level of uncertainty
regarding deal surplus is high and there is therefore greater potential for misestimation by
bidder managers.
Hypothesis 3: The impact of target runup on the bidder’s deal-related gain
increases with the degree of uncertainty.
Further, with managerial learning, the target runup should impact whether or not the
manager chooses to go forward with the deal. Luo (2005) finds evidence that the bidder
announcement return is positively related to the likelihood of deal completion, indicating
that managers listen to the market. If the target runup has information on deal surplus,
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rational managers should be less likely to complete deals which have a low target runup,
particularly if they are less certain about deal surplus.
Hypothesis 4: The target runup is positively related to the likelihood of deal
completion, and this relation is stronger in deals for which the
level of uncertainty is high.
To the extent that a runup in target value reduces the incentive of bidders to go forward
with the bid, there will be a negative relation between the target runup and the likelihood
of deal completion, which would bias us against our null in hypothesis 4.
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4.0 EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
4.1 DOES DEAL ANTICIPATION INCREASE WITH DEAL SURPLUS?
In the previous section I assume that deal related rumors are more likely to be priced in
when the potential surplus from the deal is high. This is an important assumption because
it goes to the informativeness of target runup. Without this assumption even deals with a
larger surplus could potentially have a small runup in target value, making the target runup
more noisy and therefore less informative about deal surplus. If anticipation is increasing
in deal surplus, we would expect to see the following:
1. A larger degree of deal anticipation should result in greater interest in the target stock.
Hence, the abnormal turnover (i.e., the turnover in excess of the average turnover) in
the target stock should also increase with deal surplus. Conversely, a large abnormal
turnover makes it less likely that that the deal anticipation is limited to a few market
participants.
2. With greater deal anticipation the adjustment in the target value should be closer to
the total expected premium. If the degree of anticipation increases with deal surplus,
then the target runup should represent a larger fraction of the total premium received
by the target in high surplus deals.
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4.2 DOES TARGET RUNUP CONTAIN INFORMATION ON THE DEAL
SURPLUS?
As described in section 3, the target runup is impacted by the following factors: (i) change
in target stand-alone value, (ii) synergy gains to be made (iii) target’s share of any syn-
gery gain and (iv) likelihood of deal completion. As argued earlier, the higher perceived
likelihood of completion of deals that generate a large surplus, increases the likelihood that
deal-related rumors translate into active trading/anticipation by the market, which in turn
guarantees that high surplus deals will have a larger target runup. Hence, we would expect
to find a positive relation between target runup and the deal surplus.
Deal surplus is measured in existing literature as the weighted sum of the target and
bidder abnormal return over a small window surrounding deal announcement. However,
with anticipation, at least part of the wealth effects from the deal are impounded into
the target and bidder price prior to the announcement of the deal. Hence, I measure the
wealth effect or deal surplus as the weighted average of the target and bidder return over
the window (-42, +42) surrounding deal announcement.
Note that even though the deal surplus is measured over a window that includes the
pre-announcement period, the relation between the deal surplus and the target runup is
not one that can be assumed by default. Any change in the target stand-alone value unre-
lated to the potential surplus that can be generated by replacing the target management,
would simply result in a transfer of wealth from the bidder to the target and as such the
target runup would be unrelated to the deal surplus in such cases. Similarly, if the target
runup is not informative about the deal surplus and it merely reflects the degree of deal
anticipation, then even high (low) surplus deals could potentially have a low (high) runup
in target value because they are poorly (well) anticipated. In such a case there would be
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no relation between the target runup and the deal surplus. Figures 1A and 1B provide the
intuition behind the same.
In figure 6.1, deal 2 generates a larger surplus than deal 1 (θ2 > θ1). Deal 1, however,
for some reason is better anticipated by the market than deal 2 and therefore the target
of deal 1 sees a larger runup in its value than the target of deal 2.1 In such a scenario, the
target runup would be uninformative and not systematically related to the deal surplus –
i.e., a deal with a low target runup would be just as likely to have a large surplus as a
deal with a larger runup in target value. In figure 6.2 however, deal 2 generates a larger
surplus than deal 1 and is also anticipated to a larger extent than deal 1. The target of
deal 2 therefore sees a larger runup in value. In a cross-sectional setting only this scenario
will yield a positive relation between the target runup and deal surplus.
An implicit assumption behind this test is that the deal surplus is exogenously given.
We are therefore able to examine whether there is significantly larger runup for deals with
a large surplus. While the exogeneity of deal surplus is a reasonable assumption, one might
be worried that the observed results are obtained by construction since this deal surplus
measure includes the runup period returns accruing to the target and bidder. To address
this concern I construct alternative measures of deal surplus. A detailed description of the
construction of these alternative measures is provided in a later section.
1For ease of interpretation Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are drawn under the assumption that the target extracts
the entire surplus from the deal. Relaxing this assumption and allowing the bidder to capture a share of
the surplus does not impact the suggested inferences.
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4.3 MANAGERIAL LEARNING AND BIDDER GAIN
If the target runup has information on the expected surplus from the deal then there is
scope for managerial learning, which enables managers to make a better selection of deals
by withdrawing low value/surplus deals and by reducing the likelihood that they overpay
for the target due to misestimation of the deal surplus. We would thus expect the target
runup to be positively related to the bidder’s deal-rated gain among deals that are sub-
sequently completed. Further, we would expect the target runup to have a larger impact
in deals where the degree of uncertainty about deal surplus is high. Panel A of Table 6.1
summarizes the impact of target runup on the bidder’s deal-related gain under the different
scenarios.
From Table 6.1 Panel A, the target runup will have a larger/stronger impact on the
bidder’s outcome in deals involving a greater level of uncertainty under the scenario where
the managers of the bidding firm actively use market feedback in making their pricing/deal
selection decisions. Note that in order to attract a bidder, targets of high uncertainty deals
might be more inclined/willing to share a larger part of the surplus with the bidder ir-
respective of the magnitude of the potential surplus. We might therefore expect to see a
positive relation between the deal uncertainty measures and the bidder outcome uncon-
ditionally (i.e., irrespective of the target runup). The argument in Table 6.1 Panel A,
however, is that the bidders of deals with a greater level of uncertainty fare better when
there is a larger target runup because the market feedback enables the bidder manager to
make a more informed pricing decision, and hence reduces the likelihood of overpayment.
Thus, the learning outcome is based on the marginal impact of target runup on the bidder’s
outcome in high uncertainty deals.
As proxies for uncertainty about deal surplus I use four different measures of general
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target uncertainty, effectively assuming that uncertainty about deal surplus is correlated
with uncertainty about target value more generally. These measures are: (i) mode of pay-
ment (cash versus stock), (ii) target idiosyncratic volatility, (iii) target B/M, and (iv) target
technology intensity. I assume that the choice of the mode of payment in a deal should be
related to the level of uncertainty. Managers are more likely to use stock financing when
they are less certain about deal surplus because with stock financing they can share some of
the deal-specific risk with the target. In deals involving high-technology targets or targets
with low B/M, whose value is tied to growth opportunities, uncertainty can come from the
fact that such targets are intrinsically more difficult to value. Also, the synergies involving
high-technology targets are more uncertain since the success of the deal depends on the
market potential for the growth opportunity. In addition I use the industry relatedness of
the bidder and the target as a measure of uncertainty, assuming that synergy gains are less
certain in cross-industry deals relative to same-industry deals.
I prefer the mode of payment as a measure of uncertainty because it allows us to capture
the manager’s priors in light of the other uncertainty measures. The manager might be in
possession of some private information which would lead him to be more certain about deal
surplus even when the other measures indicate a high level of uncertainty. To test whether
target runup has a larger impact in high uncertainty scenarios, I examine the sign on the
interaction term Uncertainty Measure×Target runup. Panel B of Table 6.1 summarizes
the expected signs on the interaction terms with each of the uncertainty measures.
Finally, per hypothesis 4, if the target runup is informative about deal surplus, then
rational managers would use this information in deciding whether or not to go forward
with deals – i.e., the target runup should impact the deal selection decision. To test this
hypothesis, I run a logit regression to estimate the relation between the target runup and
the likelihood of deal completion. If the target runup is informative, it should have a pos-
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itive impact on likelihood of completion. If, however, the target runup reflects an increase
in target stand-alone value, it would reduce the bidder’s incentive to complete the deal.
Further, the impact of target runup on the likelihood of deal completion should increase
with the degree of uncertainty regarding the deal/target stand-alone value since there is
greater scope for information complimentarity in such scnerios which should make the man-
ager more likely to heed to market feedback. One should note however that any observed
relation between target runup and the likelihood of completion is potentially endogenous,if
as argued earlier, deals that are perceived as being more likely to be completed are likely
to see a larger runup. Such reverse causality prevents us from making causal inference
regarding the role of target runup in impacting deal completion. The inferences in this
paper are however based on the differential impact of target runup on deal completion in




The data is extracted from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and consists of
all deals (completed, withdrawn or rumored) between 1980 and 2010. To be included in
the sample the target and the bidder firms must be publicly held with valid return data
in CRSP for a period (-372,+10) around deal announcement. The deal value must exceed
$10 million (in 2010 dollars) and represent at least 5% of the bidder’s market value 60 days
prior to deal announcement. I exclude deals involving subsidiaries and deals involving mul-
tiple bidders. Data on the implied volatility of the target (the bidder) is obtained from the
volatility surface files of the Optionmetrics database. Institutional ownership information
is obtained from the 13F filings compiled by Thomson Reuters.
Table 6.2 provides summary statistics on the sample. From Panel A we see that the
average (median) deal is $1.5 billion ($287 million). The average (median) deal is 40%
(24%) of the bidder in terms of market value of equity. The average size of the target
relative to the bidder is much larger in stock financed deals (39%) than in cash financed
deals (28.6%). Relative to cash deals the targets of stock deals on average have lower B/M,
higher idiosyncratic volatility, and are more likely to be technology intensive.
The main variables in this study are the target and bidder runup, announcement re-
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turn, total gain and the overall deal surplus. I construct five different measures of these
variables; variable definitions can be found in the appendix.1 Panel B of Table 6.2 shows
the correlation between the different measures of target and bidder runup and total gain.
The correlation between the different measures is 80% or more in the case of the target and
70% or more in the case of the bidder. The empirical results presented in the sections to
follow hold independently from the measure that is used. The results presented in tables
3 through 11 use measure 3 which (size and book-to-market match portfolio adjusted) to
construct the variables of interest.
Table 6.2 Panel B also presents the correlation between the different measures of deal
surplus. “Deal Surplus 1” is the weighted sum of the target and the bidder abnormal re-
turn over the (-42,+42) window.2 In the event that the bidder already has a toehold in the
target the weights are adjusted to account for the toehold. Deal surplus measures 2, 3 and
4 are constructed as the change in the combined market value of assets of the bidder and
the target as of 42 days, 1 year and 2 years following deal announcement relative to their
combined market value 42 days prior to deal announcement. Following the completion of
the deal the market value of the target is set to zero. The industry-adjusted deal surplus
measures are constructed by adjusting the deal surplus measures 2, 3, 4 by the change in
the market value of matched firms in the industry (matched on industry, size, B/M and
ROA). While the deal surplus measures 2, 3 and 4 are all significantly positively related to
the primary measure “Deal Surplus 1”, the relation gets progressively weaker with time:
the correlation between “Deal Surplus 1” and “Deal Surplus 3” (measured 1 year follow-
1The five measures differ in the benchmarks used to calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)
on the bidder / the target stock during the runup / the announcement window. Specifically, in measure 1
the benchmark return is estimated using the Fama-French 4-factor model. In measure 2 the value-weighted
market return is used as the benchmark. The benchmark return used in measure 3 is the return on the size
and B/M match portfolio. In measure 4 the benchmark return is calculated as the equally-weighted return
on a portfolio of 10 match firms, matched on size and B/M. Finally, measure 5 uses the change in the value
of the market index as the benchmark.
2Deal Surplus =
Bidder MVE−42∗Bidder BHAR (-42,+42)+Target MVE−42∗Target BHAR (-42,+42)
Bidder MVE−42+Target MVE−42
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ing deal announcement) is 60% while the correlation between “Deal Surplus 1” and “Deal
Surplus 4” (measured 2 years following deal announcement) is only 25%.
Figure 6.3 presents the target cumulative abnormal return in the days surrounding
deal announcement. We see that there is significant abnormal trading in the target stocks
starting 25 trading days prior to the announcement of a deal, which is accompanied by an
increase in the target market value. On average, the targets of completed deals increase in
value by 6.8% prior to deal announcement (Table 6.2, Panel C). The targets further ap-
preciate by 21% on average at announcement. Thus, the targets in the sample on average
receive a premium of 28%. About 25% (=0.07/0.28) of the total target premium accrues
to the target prior to the announcement of the deal.
The bidders, on the other hand, experience a relatively small runup of 3.1% on average
(0.6% at the median). The bidder runup is significantly larger for stock deals (mean=5.6%)
than in cash deals (mean=-0.3%), consistent with the notion that deals are more likely to
be financed with stock when the bidder stock is overvalued or has appreciated recently.
The bidder announcement CAR is significantly negative in the case of the stock deals
(mean=-3.2%) but significantly positive in cash deals (mean=1.3%). While there is no
significant post-announcement abnormal return for bidders in cash deals, the median post-
announcement return is significantly negative (-2.8%) for bidders in stock deals. However,
from Table 6.2 Panel C we see that the total bidder gain measured over the window (-
42,+42) is not significantly different from zero for bidders in cash as well as in stock
deals. The average deal (cash as well as stock) generates a surplus of 4.7% (Deal Surplus
1). Deal surplus measured over longer duration (Deal Surplus measure 3 and 4) are also
significantly positive: the median deal surplus (industry-adjusted) measured 2 years and 3
years following deal announcement is 4.5% and 5.4% respectively.
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5.2 IS DEAL ANTICIPATION RELATED TO THE DEAL SURPLUS?
As mentioned earlier, the target runup is informative because market participants are
more willing to act on rumors regarding an impending bid when the proposed deal is a
good/high surplus deal since such deals have a higher likelihood of completion. We would
therefore expect to see greater anticipation of high surplus deals in the form of observ-
able actions of market participants such as active purchase of the target stock during the
pre-announcement period. To examine whether there is a relation between the quality of
the deal (i.e., the surplus that can be generated from the deal) and deal anticipation, I
sort deals into terciles based on the deal surplus (Deal Surplus 1). If deal anticipation
is increasing in deal surplus, we would expect to see significantly higher abnormal (log)
turnover in the deals in the highest tercile of deal surplus than those in the lowest tercile.
Table 6.3 Panel A summarizes the average abnormal log turnover in the target during
the runup period (-42, -2). The abnormal turnover in targets during the runup period is
positively related to the deal surplus: while the targets in the lowest deal surplus tercile
do not see any abnormal turnover during the runup period, targets in the highest deal sur-
plus tercile see significant abnormal turnover (mean: 0.184). The average (log) abnormal
turnover of the target stocks in each deal surplus tercile is plotted in figure 6.4 and shows
a similar pattern. Table 6.3 Panel B confirms that the target average abnormal turnover
during the runup period is significantly positively related to the different measures (all but
two) of deal surplus in a multivariate setting.
While the evidence in Table 6.3 Panels A and B suggests that the extent of anticipa-
tion is positively related to the quality of the deal (i.e., deal surplus), it is not clear who
drives the information generation process. Given that informed/sophisticated investors
have the incentive to invest in gathering private information such as an impending deal
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announcement, we would expect to see significant trading activity by such investors in
the pre-announcement period. In Table 6.3 Panel C, I provide suggestive evidence that
institutions increase their holdings in the targets and that the extent of the increase in in-
stitutional ownership is related to deal quality. To this end I examine 13F filings made by
institutions with $100 million or more in assets under management. I restrict the sample
to 13F filings that were filed no earlier than 30 days prior to deal announcement so that
there is reasonable scope for deal anticipation related change in holding. In this sub-sample
I examine changes in the institutional ownership in the targets from quarter -2 to quarter
-1 (the quarter that ended just prior to deal announcement).
From Table 6.3 Panel C we see that institutional ownership in targets of high surplus
deals (deal surplus tercile = 3) increases by 1.55% (1.51% on an industry-adjusted basis)
on average in the quarter prior to deal announcement. There is no significant change in
institutional ownership in targets of low surplus deals. Targets of high surplus deals see an
average inflow of $3,785,000 ($155,000 at the median) while the targets of low surplus deals
see an average outflow of $1,150,000 ($6,000 at the median). Institutions seem to be more
willing to increase their holding in the targets of high surplus deals while being mostly
passive in targets of low surplus deals. The evidence is thus consistent with greater in-
volvement of sophisticated investors in driving the pre-announcement runup in target value.
Higher anticipation of large surplus deals should naturally result in larger runup in the
targets of such deals. Further, with higher anticipation the target runup should represent
a larger fraction of the total expected premium for the target. From Table 6.3 Panel A
(and also figure 6.5) we see that targets of high surplus deals see significantly larger runup
than those of low surplus deals. Further, on average 32% of the total target premium
is anticipated prior to deal announcement in high surplus deals (deal surplus tercile 3),
compared to 17% in low surplus deals (deal surplus tercile 1). In high surplus deals the
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runup represents a larger fraction of the total premium received by the target, which is
consistent with the assumption that deal anticipation is increasing in deal surplus.
5.3 HYPOTHESIS 1: IS THE TARGET RUNUP INFORMATIVE ABOUT
DEAL SURPLUS?
To examine whether the target runup is informative regarding deal surplus, I sort deals
into terciles based on the level of target runup. If the difference in target runup in the
cross-section is solely due to differences in the degree of deal anticipation or exogenous
changes in the target stand-alone value (i.e., for reasons unrelated to the surplus that can
be generated from the deal), we will not expect to see any systematic relation between
target runup and the overall deal surplus. However, if the target runup is informative
about the total expected surplus from the deal, we would expect to see a positive relation
between target runup and deal surplus.
Table 6.4 Panel A presents the mean and the median surplus of deals sorted by the
level of target runup. The deal surplus increases monotonically as we move from the lowest
tercile of target runup to the highest tercile. The average surplus (“Deal Surplus 1”) of
deals in the lowest tercile of target runup is not significantly different from zero (1.1%).
The average(median) surplus of deals in the highest runup tercile on the other hand is
14%(10%). While this is consistent with the notion that a larger target runup is indicative
of a better deal, one might be concerned about the extent to which this result is obtained
by construction since the deal surplus measure is a composite of the bidder and the target
BHAR over the (-42,+42) window. To address this concern, the mean and median for
alternative measures of deal surplus is also provided. These alternative measures of deal
surplus do not explicitly include the target runup, rather they measure the change in the
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combined value of the target and the bidder 42 days, 1 year and 2 years following deal
announcement. The longer window of the measures (1 year and 2 years) ensure that we
are capturing a persistent increase in value as a result of the deal. Across all the different
measures we see that the surplus generated by deals in the lowest target runup tercile is
on average 10% - 15% lower than that from deals in the highest tercile of target runup.
To further address the concern that the relation between the target runup and the
deal surplus is the result of variable construction: because the deal surplus is the weighted
sum of the bidder and the target gain, there would be a monotonic relation between the
deal surplus and the target runup as the size of the target relative to that of the bidder
increases. Hence, we could observe the relation between target runup and deal surplus
even when the runup is not truly informative. To address this concern I double sort deals
based on the level of target runup and relative size. From table 6.4 Panel B we see that
relative size does contribute to the relation between target runup and deal surplus: within
any runup tercile, the magnitude of deal surplus increases with relative size. However, the
increase in the relative size of the target cannot completely explain the relation between
target runup and deal surplus. Within a relative size group, moving from the lowest to the
highest tercile in target runup results in a significant increase in the deal surplus. Hence,
the relation between the target runup and the deal surplus is not merely the result of vari-
able construction. Relative size is included as a control variable in all multivariate analysis
in later sections.
Finally, in table 6.4 Panel C, I examine the relation between target runup and deal sur-
plus in a multivariate setting. Since we are interested in the relation between target runup
and deal surplus in the cross-section of completed deals, I use the Heckman 2-stage esti-
mator (selection model) to allow for any latent factors that are related to deal completion
to also influence the target runup. Consistent with the univariate results, the target runup
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is significantly positively related to all the different measures of deal surplus. The result
is robust to the use of industry-adjusted measures of deal surplus which reassures that the
runup is capturing deal-specific information rather than industry-wide information. The
economic significance of the coefficients is provided in table 6.4 Panel E. A one standard
deviation increase in deal surplus implies an increase between 2% and 6% in the observed
target runup.
The above results suggest that targets of high surplus deals on average see a larger
runup in value. Next, I examine the relation between the fraction of the target premium
anticipated over the runup period (anticipated premium) and deal surplus. The total pre-
mium that a target receives in a deal is related to the deal surplus. If the runup in target
value is indeed informative about the potential deal surplus then it should closely reflect
the total premium that the target receives ex-post. Table 6.4 Panel D presents the relation
between the anticipated premium 3 and deal surplus (censored Tobit regressions). We see
that the fraction of the premium anticipated over the runup period is positively related
to the deal surplus. The larger the deal surplus the closer the target runup gets to the
expected premium, suggesting that runup is more informative when the potential surplus
is large. A one standard deviation increase in deal surplus (Table 6.4 Panel E) increases
the fraction of target premium anticipated over the runup period by 2.7% - 5%.4
The multivariate evidence presented in Table 6.4 Panel C and D is consistent with the
hypothesis that target runup is a signal of the total expected surplus from the deal. Next
I examine the relation between target runup and the bidder’s deal related outcome.
3Anticipated premium is calculated as the following ratio:
Ln(Target Price (-2)/Target Price (-42))
Ln(Offer Price/Target Price (-42))
4One might worry that the runup itself might impact the total premium that a target receives in a deal.
If runup increases the bargaining power and results in markup pricing (as in Schwert (1996)), then we would
expect the runup to be a smaller fraction of the total premium.
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5.4 HYPOTHESIS 2: TARGET RUNUP AND BIDDER GAIN
Table 6.5 Panel A presents the mean and median bidder return across the target runup
terciles. There is a positive relation between the target and bidder runup: the mean and
median bidder runup in the highest target runup tercile is significantly higher than the
bidder runup in the lower (target) runup terciles. The bidder runup can be due to deal-
specific factors or due to industry-wide factors. However, the bidder return during the
runup period is significantly higher than the abnormal return of matched firms (matched
on industry,size, B/M and ROA) and the market-adjusted abnormal return of the industry.
The bidder runup is hence not driven purely by industry-wide information.
There is some evidence that the bidder abnormal return ((-1,+1) and (-1,+42)) is
slightly higher for deals in the highest tercile of target runup. The average(median) bidder
announcement return (-1,+42) in the lowest target runup tercile is -2.8% (-2.7%) while
that in the highest target runup tercile is not significantly different from zero. Looking at
the cumulative return of the bidder in the (-42,+42) window we see that bidders of deals
in the largest tercile of target runup see significant gains (6.9% at the mean and 3.8% at
the median) while the bidders of deals in the lowest tercile of target runup see significant
losses (-2.7% at the mean and -3.3% at the median). The large runup period return of the
bidders in the highest target runup tercile (8.1% at the mean and 3.7% at the median) do
not reverse even 42 days after deal announcement. A large bidder runup therefore does not
necessarily imply an overvaluation of bidder equity which is corrected subsequent to the
announcement of a deal. The univariate evidence thus suggests that the bidder’s outcome
from the deal is positively related to the target runup.
Table 6.5 Panel B presents the relation between target runup and the bidder’s outcome
from the deal in a multivariate setting. I use the Heckman 2-stage estimator to estimate the
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relation between target runup and the bidder outcome in deals that are subsequently com-
pleted. This estimation approach explicitly accounts for unobservable factors that could
impact the likelihood of completion and the bidder’s outcome from the deal simultaneously.
All results presented in Table 6.5 Panel B are however robust to simple OLS regressions
for the sub-sample of completed deals.
From models (1), (3) and (5) of Table 6.5 Panel B we see that there is a positive
relation between the target runup and the bidder announcement return (CAR (-1,+1),
CAR(-1,+42)) and the bidder total gain (bidder BHAR (-42,+42)). The coefficient in
model (1) implies that relative to deals at the 25th percentile of target runup, those at the
75th percentile have a 0.77% higher bidder 3-day announcement CAR. From model (5),
moving from the 25th percentile of target runup to the 75th percentile improves the bidder
gain (Bidder BHAR (-42,+42)) by 4.7%. A potential concern is that this positive relation
is driven by a few deals that involve targets that are doing poorly (i.e., target runup<0)
and are hence acquired cheaply by the bidder, which results in a larger bidder gain. To
address this concern, I use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target runup is positive. The
significant positive coefficient indicates that bidders in fact benefit more from acquiring
targets with positive runup than from acquiring targets with negative returns during the
runup period.
While the results re-affirm the idea that the target runup is informative, they are
consistent with two not-mutually-exclusive interpretations:
1. Since a large target runup is indicative of a deal of better quality (large surplus),
the better bidder outcome from large runup deals is simply the result of better deal
selection.
2. Managers use the target runup to update their priors on deal surplus. Because a larger
target runup is a more certain signal of deal surplus, it reduces the likelihood that the
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manager enters into an adverse contract that would have had a negative impact on the
bidder shareholders.
We can distinguish between these two possibilities using measures of uncertainty. If the
better bidder outcome from high-runup deals is purely the result of better deal selection
we would not expect to observe a significant difference in the impact of target runup on
the bidder’s outcome in deals that differ in the level of uncertainty about deal surplus.
However, if the result reflects bidder management utilization of information contained in
the runup, we would expect a stronger impact of target runup on bidder gain in deals
where the level of uncertainty about deal surplus is higher, given that in such cases there
is greater scope for managers to learn and act on the feedback by adjusting their payment
and completion decision.
5.5 HYPOTHESIS 3: TARGET RUNUP AND MANAGERIAL
LEARNING
In Table 6.6 Panel A, I use the mode of payment (cash versus stock) to capture the man-
ager’s uncertainty about deal surplus. The managerial learning hypothesis would suggest
that the target runup would have a larger impact on the bidder’s deal-related gain under
high uncertainty (i.e., in stock deals). From Table 6.6 models (1) and (5) we see that the
interaction term Target runup × Percent stock offered is significantly positive, indi-
cating that target runup has a larger impact on bidder announcement returns in stock
deals. Also, from models (2) and (6) we see that bidder announcement returns (-1,+1) and
(-1,+42) in cash-financed deals are not impacted by the target runup. However, bidder an-
nouncement return is strongly positively related to the target runup in stock deals (models
(3), (4), (7) and (8)). For example, the coefficient on target runup in deals financed wholly
with stock (model (8)) is 0.086. In economic terms, this coefficient implies that moving
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from deals in the 25th percentile of target runup to the 75th percentile would improve the
bidder announcement return over the (-1,+42) window by 2.2%.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers learn from the target
runup. By providing an estimate of the deal surplus, the target runup reduces the uncer-
tainty of the manager’s signal and lowers the likelihood that the bidder overpays for the
target. However, since a lower runup in target value is a noisier signal of deal surplus, there
is a higher likelihood that the manager’s estimate of deal surplus differs from that of the
market when the runup is low. This could explain the poorer bidder outcome when the
target runup is small, especially when the level of uncertainty about the deal/target value
is high. One might worry, however, about the use of the mode of payment as a measure
of uncertainty since unobservable factors related to choice of the mode payment may also
impact bidder’s outcome. To address the selection concerns, I re-estimate the models in
Table 6.6 Panel A in the robustness section (Table 6.11) by allowing for selection into the
observed mode of payment. To further ensure that the above results are not the result
of using the mode of payment as a measure of uncertainty, I use alternative measures to
capture the level of uncertainty. Table 6.6 Panel B presents the results from the interaction
of each of the alternative uncertainty measures with the target runup.
In models (1) and (5) I interact the target idiosyncratic volatility with the target runup
(Target runup× High Target Idiosyncratic Volatility Dummy, where the dummy is
set equal to one if the target idiosynctratic volatility is above median). As expected, the
interaction term is positive and significant (model (1): 0.04, model (5): 0.092), suggesting
that the target runup has a larger impact on the bidder gain in deals involving high uncer-
tainty targets. The coefficient on the interaction term Target runup × Target BVE/MVE
in models (2) and (6) is significantly negative (model (2): -0.03, model (6): -0.069). This
is consistent with our expectation. Following Pastor and Veronesi (2006) there is a higher
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level of uncertainty associated with firms with higher M/B ratio. Since the target runup
would be more informative/valuable to the manager in deals where the level of uncertainty
is high – i.e. when the target B/M is low, we would expect the interaction term to have a
negative coefficient.
Consistent with our expectations, the target runup has a larger impact on bidder gain
when the deal involves a target which is technology intensive: the coefficient on the inter-
atction term Target runup × High Technology Target in models (3) and (7) are 0.048
and 0.066 respectively. Finally, the coefficients on the interaction term Target runup ×
Same Industry Deal in models (4) and (8) (-0.054 and -0.055 respectively) suggest that
the target runup has a smaller impact on the bidder’s outcome in same industry deals
wherein the level of uncertainty about synergy is likely to be lower. Although there is a
negative relation between the degree of uncertainty and the bidder’s announcement return
(as implied by the negative coefficients on target idiosyncratic volatility and target tech-
nology intensity), the positive coefficients on the interaction terms imply that in scenarios
with a higher degree of uncertainty, a one standard deviation increase in target runup has
an incremental impact (relative to scenarios with a lower degree of uncertainty) on bidder’s
announcement return (-1,+1) of 0.75% - 1.35%.
In Panel C of table 6.6 I further sort deals into low, medium and high uncertainty
categories. Deals get a score of one for each of the uncertainty measures. The total uncer-
tainty score is obtained by adding the uncertainty score of the deal for each measure. The
total uncertainty score can therefore range from zero to five. A deal gets a total uncer-
tainty score of five if it satisfies all of the following: (i) is financed mostly with stock, (ii)
involves a target with high (above median) idiosyncratic volatility, (iii) involves a target
with low (below median) B/M, (iv) involves a target with high technology intensity and
(v) the target industry is different from the bidder’s primary industry (2-digit SIC). If a
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deal satisfies none of the five conditions it gets a total uncertainty score of zero. Deals
are then assigned to low (total uncertainty score ≤1), medium (2≤ total uncertainty score
≤3) and high (total uncertainty score ≥4) groups. I then re-estimate the relation between
target runup and bidder announcement return for each of the uncertainty groups (Table
6.6 Panel C).
From model (1) we see that relative to the low uncertainty group (omitted group)
deals in the medium and high uncertainty groups see significantly lower bidder announce-
ment return (-1.8% and -4.3% respectively). The coefficient on the interaction term
Target Runup × High Uncertainty however is significant and positive (5.7%) indicating
that a larger target runup is associated with an improvement in bidder outcome for this
group. Also note that the target runup does not significantly impact the bidder outcome
in deals in the low and medium uncertainty categories in models (1) and (5). Sub-sample
estimation in models (2) through (4) and (6) through (8) yields similar results. Overall,
the target runup plays a bigger role in determining the outcome of deals with a greater
level of uncertainty, which is consitent with the use of market feedback by managers of the
bidding firm in their deal pricing decision in such scenarios.
Table 6.7 provides more direct evidence on the deal pricing behavior of managers de-
pending on the level of uncertainty. If managers use the market feedback in determining
the offer price for the target, then we would expect to see that the offer price is closer to
the end of runup period price (day -2 relative to announcement day) especially when the
manager is less certain about the deal/target value. To this end, I calculate the “unan-
ticipated premium” that a target receives in a deal. The unanticipated premium is the
price premium paid to the target relative to its share price 2 days prior to deal announce-
ment scaled by the total premium (i.e., premium relative to day -42). More specifically,
the unanticipated premium is measured as 1 - anticipated premium; where the anticipated
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premium is
Ln(Target price (-2)/Target price (-42))
Ln(Offer price/Target price (-42))
. If managers “learn” from the market
then we would expect the unanticipated premium to be smaller since they choose to pay
a price close to the end of runup period price. We would therefore expect to see a smaller
unanticipated premium in deals with a greater level of uncertainty.
Table 6.7 Panel A presents the mean and median unanticipated premium for the differ-
ent measures of uncertainty and also for the low, medium and high uncertainty categories.
Of the five different uncertainty measures, we see that the unanticipated premium is lower
for the high uncertainty group in three of the measures (and not significantly different in
the other two measures). The unanticipated premium in stock deals is on average 15%
(20% at the median) lower than that in cash deals. Similarly, the unanticipated premium
for targets with high idiosyncratic volatility is on average 10% lower than that for low
idiosyncratic volatility targets and the unanticipated premium for technology intensive
targets is on average 5% lower than that for non-technology intensive targets. Figure 6.6
plots the unanticipated premium in deals in the low, medium and high uncertainty groups.
We see from figure 6.6 (and Table 6.7 Panel A), that the unanticipated premium is the
smallest for the high uncertainty group (Uncertainty Score≥4) - on average deals in the
high uncertainty category receive a 20% smaller unanticipated premium relative to the
low uncertainty category (Uncertainty Score ≤1). Panel B of Table 6.7 examines the rela-
tion between unanticipated premium and the uncertainty scores of deals in a multivariate
setting. Again, the unanticipated premium for deals in the high uncertainty group is 15.6%-
17% lower than that for deals in the low uncertainty group. The smaller unanticipated
premium for deals in the high uncertainty group suggests that when faced with a greater
level of uncertainty the manager makes a pricing decision closer to the market estimate.
Taken together the results in tables 6.6 and 6.7 suggest that the target runup plays a
larger role in influencing the pricing decision by managers and hence the bidder outcome
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in deals when there is a greater level of uncertainty. In the next set of results I examine
the impact of target runup on deal completion.
5.6 HYPOTHESIS 4: TARGET RUNUP AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF
DEAL COMPLETION
In examining the relation between target runup and the likelihood of completion, I rec-
ognize the inherent endogeneity that deals that are perceived as being more likely to be
completed see higher active trading by investors and hence are more likely to witness a
bigger runup in value. The problem of reverse causality would therefore confound any
causal interpretation. The inferences regarding the role of target runup in influencing the
completion decision is therefore based on inter group comparison. I posit that managers
are more likely to heed to market feedback when the degree of uncertainty is high. We
would therefore expect a stronger relation between the target runup and the likelihood of
completion in high uncertainty scenarios.
In table 6.8 I examine the relation between target runup and the likelihood of com-
pletion of a deal. The results presented in Table 6.8 are the average marginal effect of
the independent variables. All continuous independent variables are standardized (i.e.,
each continuous variable is mean-differenced and scaled by its own standard deviation)
so that their respective coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of a one-standard
deviation change in the independent variable on the likelihood of successful completion.
From model (1) of Table 6.8 Panel A we see that there is no significant association be-
tween target runup and the likelihood of completion. The target runup however has a
significant impact on the likelihood of completion of stock deals as the interaction term
Target Runup× Percentage Stock is significantly positive: a one-standard deviation in-
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crease in target runup increase the likelihood of completion of stock deals by 3.6%.
In models (2) through (4), I estimate the relation in sub-samples of cash deals, majority
stock deals and all stock deals. In estimating the sub-sample regressions, I allow for
selection into mode of payment by using a 2-stage estimator. In the first stage, I estimate
the following Probit regression:
Y = α+ β1 × Target Runup + β2 × Bidder Runup + β3 × Ind. Abn. Return (-42,-2)
+ β4 × Relative Size + β5 × Log(Target MVE)










+ β8 × Target Idio. Vol. + β9 × Target Idio. Vol. + β10 ×High-Techn Target
+ β11 ∗ Same Industry + β12 ∗Hostile Deal + β13 ∗ Tender Offer + β14 ∗Wave + 
where Y is set equal to one for the sub-sample of interest (all cash, majority stock,
all stock) and zero otherwise. Following Heckman (1979) I use the first stage estimates
to calculate the inverse-Mill’s Ratio and include it as a control variable in the estimation
of interest so as to explicity account for selection into the group. We see that the target
runup is unrelated to the likelihood of completion in cash deals but is significantly related
to the completion likelihood of stock deals (% Stock >0.5). A one standard deviation in
target runup increases the likelihood of completion of stock deals by 3.5% (or reduces the
likelihood of withdrawal by 3.5%). The reduction in withdrawal likelihood is significant
given that the unconditional withdrawal likelihood is about 16%. We also note that the
unconditional withdrawal likelihood is not very different across the sub-samples, thus this
finding is not simply the result of insignificant power of the test in some sub-samples.
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I also estimate the relation between target runup and the likelihood of completion
in low, medium and high uncertainty categories. From model (1) of Table 6.8 Panel B
we again see that target runup is strongly related to deal completion likelihood only for
the high uncertainty deals, as suggested by the significant positive coefficient (4.7%) on
the interaction term Target Runup× High Uncertainty. Sub-sample estimations yield
similar results. Overall, the fact that target runup impacts the likelihood the completion
only in scenarios with a large degree of uncertainty is consistent with the notion that
managers view information in market prices to be complementary to their own when they
are less certain about their own private signals. Market prices thus serve as a valuable
input to managers and impact the deal selection process in such scenarios.
5.7 TARGET RUNUP & THE CHANGE IN UNCERTAINTY AROUND
DEAL ANNOUNCEMENT
In earlier sections I argue that a larger target runup leads to a greater degree of certainty
regarding deal surplus. To verify the validity of this argument, I examine the relation be-
tween target runup and the change in uncertainty of the bidder following the announcement
of a deal. When the potential surplus that can be generated from the deal is less certain,
we would expect to see an increase in the bidder uncertainty around deal announcement.
However, if a larger target runup indicates a greater level of certainty about deal surplus,
then there should exist a negative relation between the target runup and the bidder uncer-
tainty change around deal announcement.
Following Bargeron et al. (2010) I use the implied volatility of 91-day at-the-money
options on the bidder stock as a measure of uncertainty about its value. I also construct a
measure of change in implied volatility which takes into account the portfolio effects asso-
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ciated with the combination of the bidder and the target (the change in portfolio implied
volatility). The change in the bidder implied volatility is measured as the difference be-
tween the bidder implied volaility immediately following the announcement of a deal and
its implied volatility long prior to deal announcement (calendar time (-83,-63) relative to
deal announcement). The change in portfolio implied volatility is the change in the bidder
implied volatility following deal announcement relative to the combined implied volatility
of the bidder and the target long prior to deal annoucement (calendar time (-83,-63) rela-
tive to deal announcement).5 From Table 6.9 Panel A we see that mergers are accompanied
by an increase in uncertainty for the bidder shareholders. The bidder implied volatility
increases by 1.6% on average around the announcement of a deal.6 The average as well
as the median change in the portfolio implied volatility is also significantly positive. On
average (median) the portfolio implied volatility increases by 7.9% (6.34%) surrounding
the announcement of a deal. Further,the change in the bidder (portfolio) implied volatility
is larger in the case of deals financed with stock.
From Panel B of Table 6.9 we see that the target runup is negatively related to the
percentage change in the bidder implied volatility and the percentage change in the portfolio
implied volatility around the deal announcement. However, the negative relation between
the target runup and the change in uncertainty is significant only in deals which are financed
mostly with stock (models (3), (4), (7) and (8)), which is consistent with the idea that
the target runup is more informative when the ex-ante level of uncertainty is high. On
average, a one standard deviation increase in the target runup is associated with a change
in uncertainty of the bidder which is lower by 2.56% in stock-financed deals.
5The construction of the change in bidder implied volatility and portfolio implied volatility is discussed
in appendix A1.
6The smaller sample size is due to the fact that the Optionmetrics database begins only in 1995. Also,
some of the target firms may be too small to have traded options.
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5.8 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
5.8.1 Is the relation between bidder outcome and target runup driven by
industry/macro factors?
An alternative explanation for the positive relation between bidder outcome and target
runup is that they are due to industry-wide rather than deal-specific factors. In other
words, deals with large runup and high bidder returns are from industries which have re-
cently had an improved outlook. To examine the extent to which industy outlook drives
the observed results, I estimate the relation between bidder outcome and target runup in
sub-samples sorted on the industry return in the days prior to the runup period (speci-
cally, the industry abnormal return over (-293,-43)). If the relation is driven by industries
with improved outlook (i.e., with industry return > Median), we would not expect to see
any relation between the variables in industries which have not witnessed any significant
upward trend. The result in models (1) and (2) of Table 6.10 suggest that this is not the
case: there continues to exist a positive relation between the bidder outcome and target
runup in both industry return groups, assuaging the concern that the result is limited to
deals in industries with improved outlook.
An implication of the managerial learning hypothesis is that market feedback (and
hence target runup) is most valuable to bidders when there is a greater level of uncer-
tainty. In Table 6.6 Panels A, B and C, I used measures related to uncertainty about
target stand-alone value/deal surplus to examine this assertion and find that the bidder
runup is closely related to the target runup when the level of uncertainty is high. In Table
6.10 models (3) through (6), I examine whether the results persist when I use measures
related to industry-wide uncertainty rather than deal-specific uncertainty.
Models (3) and (4) examine the relation between the bidder outcome and target runup
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in deals that are completed in wave and non-wave years. Following Ahern and Harford
(2012) a deal is classified as being part of a merger wave if it is announced in an year where
the number of deals in the industry (using Fama Frech 49 industry classification) lies in
the top quartile of the distribution of deals in the industry. If merger waves are driven by
industry-specific shocks then there is a lower level of uncertainty on the potential surplus
from the deal. We would therefore expect to see that the target runup is less beneficial to
the managers of the bidding firm when they are pursuing deals following a shock in the
industry (and hence as part of a merger wave). Consistent with our expectation there is
a significant positive relation (model (3): coefficient=0.076) between target runup and the
bidder outcome only among deals which are done in non-wave years and where there is
presumably a greater level of uncertainty.
In models (5) and (6) of Table 6.10, I sort deals based on the industry B/M. Similar
to the Target B/M measure we would expect a greater level of uncertainty associated with
deals in industries which have lower B/M since they are likely to be growth rather than
asset-in-place industries. The coefficient on target runup is significant only among deals
which take place in industries with below median B/M (model (5): coefficient=0.062). The
results are thus materially similar to the case where I use Target B/M to capture the level
of uncertainty.
5.8.2 Can the Results be Explained by Self-Selection of Firms into Dif-
ferent Methods of Payment?
The mode of payment (cash vs. stock) is used as the primary measure of uncertainty faced
by the manager regarding deal surplus and/or target stand-alone value. A valid concern
with this measure is the extent to which self-selection by firms into different modes of pay-
ment explains the observed relation between target runup and bidder gain. To address this
concern, I use a selection model (Heckman’s selection model) to control for any unobserved
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correlation between factors that determine the choice of mode of payment and the bidder’s
deal related gain. If the unobserved factors that determine the choice of payment method
also drive the bidder announcement return, then we would expect the significance on the
coefficient on target runup to disappear once these unobserved factors are controlled for.
In table 6.11 I use selection equations to determine selection into the mode of payment:
majority cash (% cash > 0.5) and majority stock (% stock > 0.5). The selection equation
includes two additional controls, namely: (i) low target price dummy (=1 if target price
(-42) ≤ $5) and (ii) bidder cash/assets. The underlying assumptions behind the two
additional control variables is that they are potentially related to the choice of mode of
payment but unrelated to the bidder gain itself. The coefficient on the Inverse-Mill’s Ratio
(which is a measure of the degree to which unobserved factors that contribute to selection
into the group also impact the outcome variable of interest) in table 11 is only significant
suggesting that self selection is not a significant factor contributing to the bidder’s deal
related gain. Even after controlling for the potential self selection of bidders into different
modes of payment, the bidder’s outcome continues to be positively related to the target
runup in stock (models(3) and (4)) deals but not so in cash deals (models (1) and (2)).
5.8.3 Are the Results driven by Model-Specification?
One of the central findings of this paper is that there is a positive relation between target
runup and the bidder outcome, more so, in deals involving a greater level of uncertainty.
In this section, I relax the assumption of linearity in the relation between the bidder gain
and the target runup, which is implicit in my regression based analysis. As an alternative
test, I match deals which have a similar target runup but differ in the level of uncertainty.
If, on average, the bidder gain is increasing in deal surplus, we would expect to observe
this effect in deals with low uncertainty as well as in deals with high uncertainty. However,
if the relation between the bidder gain and the target runup is due to factors attributable
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to managerial learning, we would observe this result only in deals with greater uncertainty.
I use the mode of payment to capture the level of uncertainty. Hence, for each stock
deal (percent stock>0.5) with target runup>0 (or target runup<0), I find matching cash
deals (percent cash >0.5) that have a target runup within a (-20%, +20%) threshold.7
By subtracting the bidder gain in cash deals with a similar target runup (i.e., a similar
expected deal surplus), we can purge the bidder gain of any effect which is common to both
stock and cash deals. In other words, we difference out any effect of target runup that is
common to both low and high uncertainty deals.
From Table 6.12 we see that the average deal surplus is lower in the sample with target
runup<0 than in the sample where target runup>0. Further, we see that in stock as well as
in cash deals, the bidder gain is increasing with the deal surplus. For example, the average
bidder gain in deals financed with cash is -0.015 in the sub-sample with target runup<0
which are of lower value (average deal surplus=0.008). The bidder gain is much larger (on
average 0.026) in the sub-sample with target runup>0 which includes deals with a larger
surplus (average deal surplus=0.093). This suggests that the improvement in bidder gain
with target runup can at least partly be attributed to better quality (larger surplus) of
deals which see a larger runup in target value.
More importantly, in deals with target runup<0, the bidder gain in stock deals is 4.6%
lower than in matched cash deals. Thus, even after controlling for any effect that is com-
mon to low and high uncertainty deals, the bidder gain in stock deals is lower than matched
cash deals when target runup<0. There is, however, no significant difference between the
bidder gain in stock deals and matched cash deals when target runup>0. This result is
consistent with the managerial learning hypothesis: a larger target runup is a more reliable
7The exact matching procedure is described in Table 6.12.
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signal of deal surplus and it therefore reduces the likelihood that the managers overpay
for the target even when there is a high level of uncertainty. Hence, there is no significant
difference in the bidder gain in low and high uncertainty deals when the target runup is high.
On the other hand, a low runup in target value is a much noisier signal of deal surplus
and even when the manager updates his priors in response to the market feedback, there
is a greater likelihood that he may be overestimating the deal surplus. The average bidder
gain realized upon observing a low runup (target runup<0) is thus significantly smaller
in stock deals where there is a higher uncertainty about deal surplus. Overall, while the
matching procedure suggests that the improvement in the bidder’s outcome with target
runup is in part due to higher quality (larger surplus) of deals, it is also consistent with
the managerial learning based interpretation.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
The results presented in this paper provide evidence that the target runup contains useful
information about the surplus that can be expected from the deal: on average a higher
target runup is indicative of a larger deal surplus. The differences in target runup in the
cross-section are not merely a result of differences in deal anticipation but rather are due at
least in part to differences in the market’s estimate of deal surplus. I also provide evidence
that managers use this market feedback in improving the precision of their private signal,
particularly when the level of uncertainty is high. Target runup thus benefits the bidder
shareholders by: (i) reducing the likelihood that manager overestimates deal surplus and
overpays for the target, and (ii) enabling better deal selection. This suggests that managers
view the market as a complementary source of information.
One of the implications of the results presented in this paper is that there may be
systematic biases in the way synergy/deal surplus is currently measured in the literature.
Since deals with a larger surplus are anticipated to a greater degree, any estimate of deal
surplus that ignores the pre-announcement window is likely to underestimate the surplus
of those deals that truly generate a large surplus. This paper also provides a rational expla-
nation for the dominantly observed outcome that the targets of completed deals experience
significant runup in value. It does so by allowing market prices to contain information that
is complementary to the manager’s information set and allowing for managerial learning
from such market feedback.
46
The results in this paper refute the existence of markup pricing in mergers and suggest
that managers use the feedback from the market appropriately when it comes to deal
selection and pricing. The evidence also reinforces the role of the market in determining the
outcome of privately negotiated deals. It contributes to the growing stream of literature
which argues that there is potential for insiders to learn from the market and thereby
increase the precision of their private signals. In the larger context, learning from the
market improves allocational efficiency by helping firms avoid potential investment pitfalls.
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Figure 6.1: Deal Surplus and Target Runup: Case 1
Case 1: Target runup solely reflects differences in the degree of deal anticipation: If deal anticipation is
unrelated to the expected deal surplus then even high surplus deals could see a smaller runup in target
value if they are anticipated poorly. In the figure below, Target 2 which is involved in a deal with larger
surplus (θ2 > θ1) sees a smaller runup in value than Target 1 (θR2 < θR1) because it is less anticipated.
Target 2 however sees a larger announcement return than Target 1.
Figure 6.2: Deal Surplus and Target Runup: Case 2
Case 2: Target runup reflects expected deal surplus: If deals with larger surplus are better anticipated,
then the target runup would reflect the expected deal surplus. In the figure below, Target 2 sees a larger
runup in its value (θR2 > θR1) because it is involved in a deal with a larger surplus (θ2 > θ1), which is
anticipated to a greater degree by the market.
Figure 6.3: Target Abnormal Return and Abnormal Turnover Relative to Deal Announce-
ment Day
The industry adjusted BHAR is the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the target stock over
the window (-42, t) and the median of the buy-and-hold return of all other stocks in the target 2-digit SIC
over the same period. The plotted figure is the average industry adjusted BHAR of all targets of completed
deals.
The abnormal log turnover of a target stock on any day t is calculated as the difference between its
log turnover on day t and the median of its log turnover which was estimated over the window (-294,-43)
relative to deal announcement. The industry abnormal log turnover is the median abnormal log turnover of
all firms in the targets 2-digit SIC. The industry adjusted abnormal log turnover is obtained by subtracting
the abnormal log turnover in the industry from the abnormal log turnover in the target stock. The plotted
figure is the average industry adjusted abnormal log turnover in targets of completed deals in the days
surrounding deal announcement.
Figure 6.4: Target Average Abnormal Turnover Sorted by Deal Surplus
The abnormal log turnover of a target stock on any day t is calculated as the difference between the
logarithm of its turnover on day t and the median of its log turnover which was estimated over the window
(-294,-43) relative to deal announcement. The industry abnormal log turnover is the median abnormal log
turnover of all firms in the targets 2-digit SIC. The industry adjusted abnormal log turnover is obtained by
subtracting the abnormal log turnover in the industry from the abnormal log turnover in the target stock.
The average industry adjusted abnormal log turnover (plotted) on any day t relative to deal announcement
is obtained by averaging the industry adjusted abnormal log turnover of all target stocks (of competed
deals) in a given deal surplus tercile.
Figure 6.5: Target Abnormal Return Sorted by Deal Surplus
The industry adjusted BHAR return is the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the target stock
over the window (-42, t) and the median of the buy-and-hold return of all other stocks in the target 2-digit
SIC over the same period. Deals are sorted into terciles based on the value of deal surplus. The plotted
figure is the average industry adjusted BHAR of all targets in a given deal surplus tercile.
Figure 6.6: Offer Price relative to Target Price Sorted by Degree of Uncertainty
Deals are sorted into low (Uncertainty Score≤1), Medium (2≤Uncertainty Score≤3) and High (Uncertainty
Score≥4) groups based on their composite uncertainty score. The composite uncertainty score for a deal is
obtained by adding its uncertainty score for each of the following uncertainty measures (i) Percent Stock
(score=1 if % Stock >0.5 and 0 otherwise), (ii) target idiosyncratic volatility (score=1 if target idiosyncratic
volatility > Median and 0 otherwise), (iii) Target BVE/MVE (score=1 if target BVE/MVE < Median and
0 otherwise), (iv) target technology intensity (score=1 if target is technology intensive and 0 otherwise)
and (v) target industry relatedness (score=1 if target and bidder primary industry classification (2-digit
SIC) is the different and 0 otherwise). The figure plotted is the fraction of the target premium anticipated
prior to announcement. Specifically, for each day t the ratio:
Ln(Target Price (t)/Target Price (-42))
Ln(Offer Price/Target Price (-42))
.
Following the announcement of the deal the fraction of the premium anticipated is set equal to 1 since the
offer price is revealed on the announcement day. The figure plotted is the median of the above mentioned
ratio for firms in the low/medium/high uncertainty groups.






Differ by Level of
Uncertainty?
Target runup reflects difference in
the degree of deal anticipation only.
Zero No
Target runup reflects an exogenous
increase in the stand-alone value of
the target.
Negative No
Target runup increases the
bargaining power of the target.
Negative No
Target runup reflects the market’s
estimate of deal value. Managers
learn from target runup which
enables better deal selection /



































Table 6.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A contains the summary statistics on the sample of completed deals. Panel B provides the
correlation between different measures of runup, announcement return for the bidder and the target
and also the correlation between the deal surplus measures. Panel C has the summary statistics on the
target/bidder runup, announcement return and post-announcement return and deal surplus.
The deal value is the SDC deal value in millions in 2010 dollars. The target (bidder) MVA (expressed
in millions 2010 dollars) is calculated as the target (bidder) total assets less the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity on day -42. The target idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation
of the residuals of the target returns estimated using the Fama-French 4-factor model over a 252 day
window (-294, -43). The target (bidder) BVE/MVE is the ratio of the book value of the target (bidder)
equity to the market value of the target (bidder) equity (both values are from the fiscal year prior to
announcement). Same industry deal is a dummy equal to one if the target and the bidder share the same
2-digit SIC code. High technology target is a dummy equal to one if the primary SIC target belongs to a
technology intensive industry (as coded by the SDC).
The runup, announcement return and post-announcement return of the target (bidder) are all measured
as the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over following windows (t, t + i) surrounding the an-
nouncement of a deal: runup window (-42, -2), announcement return window (-1,1), post-announcement
return window (+2, +42). I construct 5 different measures of buy-and-hold abnormal return:
Measure 1: Πt+it
(
1 + Ri,t − Rf,t
) − Πt+it (1 + αˆi + βˆ1i(RMkt,t − Rf,t) + βˆ2iRSMB,t +
βˆ3iRHML,t + βˆ4iRUMD,t
)
where αˆi, βˆi are the estimates from the Fama-
















) − log(Market Indexi,tMarket Indext ) where Pi is the target (the bidder) price
on day t.
The measure “Deal Surplus - 1” is the weighted sum of the target and bidder BHAR over the (-42,+42)
window relative to the announcement date. The weight of the bidder and the target are calculated using
their respective market value of equity 42-days prior deal announcement day, after adjusting for any
bidder holding/toehold in the target. The measures “Deal Surplus - 2”, “Deal Surplus - 3” and “Deal
Surplus - 4” are constructed respectively as the change in the combined market value of assets of the
bidder and the target 42 days, 1 year and 2 years after deal announcement relative to their combined
values 42 days prior to deal announcement (scaled by the combined market value of assets on day -42).
Following the completion of the deal the target market value is set equal to zero. The Industry-adjusted
deal surplus measures are constructed by adjusting the deal surplus measures by the change in the
market value of match firms in the same industry (matched on industry, size, B/M and ROA).
The details of the construction of the five measures are discussed in the appendix. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate







(1) (2) (3) (3)-(2)
Deal Value
(in 2010 $ million)
Mean 1,547 895 1,458 0.029
Median 287 244 272 0.227
N 1,897 472 656
Target MVA
(in 2010 $ million)
Mean 1,621 989 1,409 0.107
Median 320 260 284 0.353
N 1,812 447 625
Target MVE (day -42)
(in 2010 $ million)
Mean 1,078 636 1072 0.035
Median 202 175 214 0.064
N 1,680 419 589
Bidder MVA
(in 2010 $ million)
Mean 9,242 9,840 8,999 0.753
Median 1,583 2,153 1,358 0.010
N 1795 435 605
Bidder MVE (day -42)
(in 2010 $ million)
Mean 6,411 6,248 6,950 0.693
Median 1,099 1,356 1,086 0.259
N 1,804 438 606
Relative Size
Mean 0.405 0.286 0.389 0.000
Median 0.243 0.154 0.264 0.000





) Mean 0.588 0.660 0.500 0.000
Median 0.459 0.544 0.347 0.000





) Mean 0.454 0.499 0.346 0.000
Median 0.369 0.424 0.260 0.000
N 1,784 429 604
Target Idiosyncratic
Volatility
Mean 0.037 0.032 0.044 0.000
Median 0.032 0.028 0.039 0.000
N 1,565 400 528
Same-industry Deal
Mean 0.795 0.803 0.805
N 1,973 472 656
High-technology Target
Mean 0.512 0.538 0.661
N 1,973 472 656
Panel B
Target runup (-42,-2) (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e)
Fama-French 4-factor adjusted (1a) 1
Market-adjusted (1b) 0.912∗∗∗ 1
Size & B/M match portfolio adjusted (1c) 0.893∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 1
Industry, Size & B/M match firm adj. (1d) 0.795∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 1
Price-based (1e) 0.846∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 1
Target Ann. Ret. (-1,+1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e)
Fama-French 4-factor adjusted (2a) 1
Market-adjusted (2b) 0.998∗∗∗ 1
Size & B/M match portfolio adjusted (2c) 0.997∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 1
Industry, Size & B/M match firm adjusted (2d) 0.990∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 1
Price-based (2e) 0.960∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 1
Target Post-Ann. Ret. (+2,+42) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e)
Fama-French 4-factor adjusted (2a) 1
Market-adjusted (2b) 0.879∗∗∗ 1
Size & B/M match portfolio adjusted (2c) 0.840∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 1
Industry, Size & B/M match firm adjusted (2d) 0.890∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 1
Price-based (2e) 0.765∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 1
Bidder runup (-42,-2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e)
Fama-French 4-factor adjusted (3a) 1
Market-adjusted (3b) 0.871∗∗∗ 1
Size & B/M match portfolio adjusted (3c) 0.841∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 1
Industry, Size & B/M match firm adjusted (3d) 0.743∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 1
Price-based (3e) 0.752∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 1
Bidder Ann. Ret (-1,+1) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e)
Fama-French 4-factor adjusted (4a) 1
Market-adjusted (4b) 0.992∗∗∗ 1
Size & B/M match portfolio adjusted (4c) 0.984∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 1
Industry, Size & B/M match firm adjusted (4d) 0.944∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 1
Price-based (4e) 0.921∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 1
Bidder Post-Ann. Ret (+2,+42) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e)
Fama-French 4-factor adjusted (4a) 1
Market-adjusted (4b) 0.852∗∗∗ 1
Size & B/M match portfolio adjusted (4c) 0.810∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 1
Industry, Size & B/M match firm adjusted (4d) 0.784∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 1
Price-based (4e) 0.734∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 1
Panel B (cont’d)
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f) (2g)
Deal Surplus - 1 (2a)
Weighted sum of bidder and target
abnormal return (-42,+42)
1
Deal Surplus - 2 (2b)
Combined change in bidder and target
42-days after deal announcement
0.763∗∗∗ 1
Ind. Adj. Deal Surplus - 2 (2c)
Ind. adj. combined change in bidder
and target 42-days after deal announcement
0.599∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 1
Deal Surplus - 3 (2d)
Combined change in bidder and target
year after deal completion
0.397∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 1
Ind.Adj. Deal Surplus - 3 (2e)
Ind. adj. combined change in bidder
and target year after deal announcement
0.338∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 1
Deal Surplus - 4 (2f)
Combined change in bidder and target
2 years after after deal announcement
0.253∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 1
Ind. Adj. Deal Surplus - 4 (2g)
Ind. adj. combined change in bidder
and target 2 years after deal announcement
0.175∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 1
Panel C
ALL DEALS CASH-ONLY DEALS STOCK-ONLY DEALS
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Measure 3: Size & B/M portfolio matched
Target Runup 0.068∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 1,634 0.059∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 418 0.067∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 564
Target Ann. Ret. 0.210∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 1,625 0.296∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 415 0.173∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 561
Target Post-Ann. Ret. -0.001 -0.005∗∗ 1,622 -0.010∗ -0.006∗ 414 0.017 0.000 561
Target Total Gain (-42,+42) 0.277∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 1,620 0.351∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 414 0.251∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 560
Bidder Runup 0.029∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 1,725 -0.003 -0.008 417 0.056∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 572
Bidder Ann. Ret. -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 1,724 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 416 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ 572
Bidder Post-Ann. Gain -0.008∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 1,724 -0.006 -0.010 416 -0.015 -0.027∗∗∗ 572
Bidder Total Gain (-42,+42) 0.008 -0.008 1,724 0.004 -0.007 416 0.010 -0.010 572
Deal Surplus - 1 0.047∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 1,547 0.047∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 395 0.045∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 527
Deal Surplus - 2 0.090∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 1,343 0.064∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 337 0.125∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 487
Ind.-Adj. Deal Surplus - 2 0.063∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 1,132 0.057∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 280 0.077∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 407
Deal Surplus - 3 0.219∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 1,175 0.131∗∗∗ 0.029 285 0.317∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 415
Ind.-Adj. Deal Surplus - 3 0.134∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 1,117 0.070∗∗∗ 0.007 278 0.233∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 397
Deal Surplus - 4 0.336∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 1,084 0.249∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 269 0.436∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 372
Ind.-Adj. Deal Surplus - 4 0.184∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 1,031 0.132∗∗∗ 0.030∗ 263 0.259∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 356
Table 6.3: Relation between Deal Surplus and Deal Anticipation
Panel A presents the mean and median abnormal log turnover in the target and the fraction of target premium
anticipated over the runup period in each deal surplus tercile. Panel B presents the relation between deal surplus and
pre-announcement abnormal turnover in the target stock in a multi-variate setting. The log abnormal turnover in the
target for any day t is equal to the logarithm of turnover in day t minus the median estimated log turnover in the target
(the median is estimated over the window (-294, -43)). The fraction of the target premium anticipated is the ratio of
the target runup to the total target premium, i.e.,
Ln(Target Price (-2)/Target Price (-42))
Ln(Offer Price/Target Price (-42))
. The ratio is censored at
-1 and 1 at the left and right tails. Target runup is measured as the target BHAR over (-42,-2) constructed as per
measure 3 described in the appendix. Industry abnormal return is the market-adjusted abnormal return of firms in the
same 2-digit SIC as the target. The measure “Deal Surplus - 1” is the weighted sum of the target and bidder BHAR
over the (-42,+42) window relative to the announcement date. The weight of the bidder and the target are calculated
using their respective market value of equity 42-days prior deal announcement, after adjusting for any bidder toehold
in the target. The measures “Deal Surplus - 2”, “Deal Surplus - 3” and “Deal Surplus - 4” are constructed respectively
as the change in the combined market value of assets of the bidder and the target 42 days, 1 year and 2 years after
deal announcement relative to their combined values 42 days prior to deal announcement (scaled by the combined
market value of assets on day -42). Following the completion of a deal the target market value is set to zero. The
Industry-adjusted deal surplus measures are constructed by adjusting the deal surplus measures by the change in the
market value of match firms in the same industry (matched on industry, size, B/M and ROA). Panel C presents the
institutional ownership and the change in institutional ownership in targets which had a deal announcement date
within 30 days of a quarter-end. The institutional ownership and the change in institutional ownership is calculated
from quarterly 13-F filings (which are made by institutions with $100 Million or more in assets under management).
See the appendix for a description of the control variables. In panel B the value presented in the parenthesis is the






1 2 3 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
Average Abnormal Log
Turnover in Targets
Mean 0.039 0.099∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.120 0.028 0.001
Median 0.015 0.045∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.458 0.017 0.001
Target Runup
Mean 0.002 0.079∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median -0.011 0.041∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Percentage of Total
Premium Anticipated
Mean 0.168∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.182 0.006 0.000
Median 0.223∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.527 0.000 0.000
Average Target Runup
/ Average Total gain
0.014 0.240 0.309
Median Target Runup




The dependent variable in models (1) through (7) is the average abnormal log turnover in the target over (-42,-2) window
relative to deal announcement. The deal surplus measure in model (1) is the weighted sum of the bidder and target BHAR over
the (-42, +42) period. In models (2), (3) and (4), deal surplus is measured as:
Deal Surplus =
(Bidder Mkt. Val. Post + Target Mkt. Val. Post) - (Bidder Mkt. Val. Pre + Target Mkt. Val. Pre)
Bidder Mkt. Val. Pre + Target Mkt. Val. Pre
The bidder/target market value Pre is the market value of assets of the bidder/target 42 days prior to deal announcement. In
models (2), (3) and (4) the bidder/target market value Post is the market value of the bidder/target 42 days, 1 year and 2 years
following the deal announcement. Following the completion of a deal the target market value is set to zero. In models (5), (6)
and (7) the deal surplus from models (2), (3) and (4) is adjusted by subtracting the change in the market value of matched-firms
(matched on Industry, size, B/M and ROA) over the same period.







Deal Surplus Measure: 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Completed Deal Dummy 0.064∗ -0.039 0.051 -0.019 0.057 0.047 -0.019
(=1 if deal is completed) [0.039] [0.160] [0.165] [0.175] [0.164] [0.165] [0.173]
Deal Surplus † 0.266∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.035 0.163∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.017
[0.071] [0.079] [0.029] [0.023] [0.083] [0.031] [0.023]
Log Target MVE 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.010
[0.011] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015]
Target BVE/MVE -0.011 -0.002 0.047 0.037 -0.003 0.044 0.031
[0.038] [0.044] [0.053] [0.054] [0.048] [0.054] [0.055]
Target Idio. Volatility -2.166∗ -2.488∗ -2.488∗ -2.097 -3.140∗∗ -2.699∗ -2.215
[1.195] [1.302] [1.448] [1.452] [1.427] [1.491] [1.496]
Toehold -0.005∗ -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
High-tech Target Dummy 0.020 -0.010 -0.025 -0.051 -0.000 -0.007 -0.017
[0.041] [0.046] [0.050] [0.050] [0.051] [0.052] [0.052]
Same-Industry Dummy -0.015 0.008 -0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.018 -0.006
[0.040] [0.046] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.052] [0.053]
Hostile-Deal Dummy 0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.021 -0.022 -0.040 -0.052
[0.075] [0.112] [0.138] [0.143] [0.137] [0.142] [0.148]
Tender-Offer Dummy -0.034 -0.021 -0.043 -0.061 -0.037 -0.041 -0.056
[0.040] [0.044] [0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.050] [0.051]
Wave Dummy -0.077∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.065∗ -0.043 -0.070∗ -0.069∗ -0.047
[0.030] [0.034] [0.038] [0.039] [0.038] [0.039] [0.040]
Constant -0.192∗ -0.209 -0.614∗∗∗ -0.251 0.119 0.128 0.356
[0.115] [0.204] [0.189] [0.232] [0.189] [0.191] [0.236]
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,438 1,183 1,062 972 1,040 1,027 948
R-squared 0.062 0.064 0.051 0.051 0.059 0.058 0.058






1 2 3 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
(N=118) (N=172) (N=158)
Target market value of equity quarter -2 (in $ Billion)
Mean 616 1688 881 0.964 0.266 0.686
Median 180 278 161 0.666 0.000 0.309
Institutional ownership in target from quarter -2 (%)
Mean 39.43 47.59 37.20 0.413 0.000 0.621
Median 41.01 42.70 28.55 0.423 0.002 0.255
Change in institutional ownership
in the target from quarter -2 to -1 (%)
Mean 0.388 1.551∗∗∗ 1.510∗∗∗ 0.035 0.906 0.042
Median 0.120 0.682∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.084 0.343 0.224
Ind.-adj. change in instit. ownership
target from quarter -2 to -1 (%)
Mean -0.017 1.412∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗ 0.065 0.912 0.040
Median -0.083 0.185∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.078 0.345 0.104
Inst. inflow into target qtr -1 ($ thousand)
(calculated using median price during qtr)
Mean -1103 1720 3271 0.715 0.906 0.771
Median -6 37 188 0.179 0.543 0.076
Ind.-adj. instit. inflow into target qtr -1 ($ thousand)
(calculated using median price during qtr)
Mean -1150 1942 3875 0.719 0.897 0.758
Median -6 144 153 0.106 0.543 0.104
Table 6.4: Target Runup and Deal Surplus
Panel A presents the mean and median deal surplus of completed deals sorted into terciles based on the level of target
runup. Panel B has the mean and median surplus of deals sorted on target runup and the relative size of the target to
the bidder. Panel C contains the results from the regression (using a Heckman 2-step estimator to allow for selection into
the completed deals category) of target runup on different measures of deal surplus and other controls. The measure “Deal
Surplus - 1” is the weighted sum of the target and bidder BHAR over the (-42,+42) window relative to the announcement
date. The weight of the bidder and the target are calculated using their respective market value of equity 42-days prior deal
announcement day, after adjusting for any bidder holding/toehold in the target. The measures “Deal Surplus - 2”, “Deal
Surplus - 3” and “Deal Surplus - 4” are constructed respectively as the change in the combined market value of assets of
the bidder and the target 42 days, 1 year and 2 years after deal announcement relative to their combined values 42 days
prior to deal announcement (scaled by the combined market value of assets on day -42). Following the completion of a deal
the target market value is set to zero. The Industry-adjusted deal surplus measures are constructed by adjusting the deal
surplus measures by the change in the market value of match firms in the same industry (matched on industry, size, B/M and
ROA). Target runup is measured as the target BHAR over (-42,-2) constructed as per measure 3 described in the appendix.
Industry abnormal return is the market-adjusted abnormal return of firms in the same 2-digit SIC as the target. See the
appendix for a description of the other control variables used in Panel C. In panel C the value presented in the parenthesis
is the standard error of the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%





1 2 3 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
Deal Surplus - 1
Weighted sum of bidder
and target BHAR (-42,+42)
Mean -0.011 0.061∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median -0.011 0.059∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.000 0.067 0.000
N 417 419 420
Deal Surplus - 2
Change in combined MV of Assets
of bidder and target from -42 to +42
relative to announcement day
Mean 0.031∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median 0.017∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002 0.000
N 427 424 420
Ind.-adjusted Deal Surplus - 2
Change in combined MV of Assets
bidder and target from -42 to +42
relative to announcement day adjusted
by change in industry-matched firms
Mean 0.016 0.048∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.034 0.000 0.000
Median 0.013 0.047∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.005 0.012 0.000
N 370 358 374
Deal Surplus - 3
Change in combined MV of Assets
of bidder and target from -42 to 1
year after announcement day
Mean 0.130∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.043 0.015 0.000
Median 0.033∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.017 0.028 0.000
N 377 370 374
Ind.-adjusted Deal Surplus - 3
Change in combined MV of Assets
of bidder and target from -42 to 1 year
after announcement day adjusted by
change in industry-matched firms.
Mean 0.055∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.251 0.002 0.000
Median -0.009 0.047∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.002 0.073 0.000
N 368 352 366
Deal Surplus - 4
Change in combined MV of Assets
of bidder and target from -42 to 2
years after announcement day.
Mean 0.266∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.409 0.020 0.003
Median 0.075∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.020 0.673 0.019
N 353 334 349
Ind.-adjusted Deal Surplus - 4
Change in combined MV of Assets
of bidder and target from -42 to 2
years after announcement day adjusted by
change in industry-matched firms
Mean 0.155∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.800 0.077 0.104
Median -0.012 0.073∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.036 0.611 0.020
N 345 317 342
Panel B
Mean/Median Deal Surplus





1 2 3 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
Relative Size
∈ [0, 0.15]
Mean 0.037∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.627 0.040 0.030
Median 0.006 0.044∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.030 0.014 0.000
N 147 142 165
Relative Size
∈ (0.15, 0.30]
Mean 0.019 0.059∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.174 0.014 0.001
Median 0.009 0.068∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.014 0.516 0.012
N 110 95 98
Relative Size
∈ (0.30, 0.50]
Mean 0.027 0.087∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.093 0.042 0.001
Median 0.025 0.079∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.300 0.726 0.004
N 79 78 56
Relative Size
∈ (0.5,∞)
Mean 0.042∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.004 0.002 0.000
Median 0.046∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.021 0.017 0.000
N 88 106 111
Panel C
The dependent variable in models (1) through (7) is the runup in the target value over (-42,-2) window relative to deal
announcement. The deal surplus measure in model (1) is the weighted sum of the bidder and target BHAR over the (-42,
+42) period. In models (2), (3) and (4), deal surplus is measured as:
Deal Surplus =
(Bidder Mkt. Val. Post + Target Mkt. Val. Post) - (Bidder Mkt. Val. Pre + Target Mkt. Val. Pre)
Bidder Mkt. Val. Pre + Target Mkt. Val. Pre
The bidder/target market value Pre is the market value of assets of the bidder/target 42 days prior to deal announcement.
In models (2),(3) and (4) the bidder/target market value Post is the market value of the bidder/target 42 days, 1 year
and 2 years following the deal announcement. Following the completion of a deal the target market value is set to zero.
The industry adjusted deal surplus measure is calculated by subtracting the change in the market value of matched-firms
(matched on Industry, size, B/M and ROA) over the same period.
Dependent Variable: Target Runup (-42,-2)
Ind-Adj Ind-Adj Ind-Adj
Deal Surplus Measure: 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deal Surplus† 0.273∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
[0.047] [0.028] [0.013] [0.009] [0.030] [0.013] [0.009]
All-Cash Dummy -0.035 -0.043∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.053∗∗
[0.024] [0.022] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
Percent Stock Offered 0.012 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 -0.006
[0.036] [0.024] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Relative Size 0.020 0.024 0.049∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.026 0.047∗∗ 0.037∗
[0.022] [0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020]
Log Target MVE -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Target BVE/MVE 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.011
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.040∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.035 -0.045∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.033
[0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.024] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024]
Target Idio. Volatility 0.190 -0.020 -0.407 -0.364 -0.452 -0.554 -0.559
[0.499] [0.500] [0.535] [0.557] [0.538] [0.545] [0.565]
Bidder Idio. Volatility -1.712∗∗ -1.750∗∗ -1.808∗∗ -1.303∗ -1.599∗∗ -1.815∗∗ -1.286
[0.763] [0.694] [0.747] [0.788] [0.738] [0.762] [0.800]
Toehold -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
High-tech Target Dummy 0.010 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.006
[0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]
Same-Industry Dummy -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006
[0.024] [0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.066 -0.074∗ -0.084∗ -0.096∗ -0.063 -0.087∗ -0.099∗
[0.080] [0.043] [0.050] [0.052] [0.050] [0.052] [0.053]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.033 0.034∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.037∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.049∗∗
[0.035] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Wave Dummy 0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 -0.007
[0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
Constant 0.600∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.251∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.241∗
[0.228] [0.223] [0.135] [0.134] [0.132] [0.136] [0.136]
Mill’s Lambda -0.020 -0.103 -0.128 -0.177* -0.181* -0.123 -0.107
[0.108] [0.094] [0.101] [0.104] [0.101] [0.102] [0.105]
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Uncensored Observations 1,176 1,167 1,046 963 1,030 1,016 937
Wald Chi-square Statistic 155.75∗∗∗ 157.40∗∗∗ 90.08∗∗∗ 66.71∗∗ 128.81∗∗∗ 95.05∗∗∗ 65.79∗
†: Deal Surplus is measured differently in each of the specifications. Please refer text on top of the table
Panel D
The results presented in the table are from Tobit regressions† since the dependent variable is censored at -1 and
+1. The dependent variable in models (1) through (7) is the fraction of the target premium that is anticipated
over the runup period. It is measured as:
Fraction of premium anticipated =
Ln(Target Price (-2)/Target Price (-42))
Ln(Offer Price/Target Price (-42))
Dependent Variable : Fraction of total premium anticipated
Ind-Adj Ind-Adj Ind-Adj
Deal Surplus Measure: 1 2 3 4 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deal Surplus‡ 0.143∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.030∗∗
[0.065] [0.079] [0.028] [0.020] [0.064] [0.022] [0.015]
All-Cash Dummy -0.031 -0.027 0.005 0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.003
[0.050] [0.050] [0.052] [0.055] [0.052] [0.052] [0.055]
Percent Stock Offered 0.099∗ 0.100∗ 0.103∗ 0.119∗ 0.091 0.086 0.111∗
[0.059] [0.058] [0.061] [0.063] [0.062] [0.062] [0.065]
Relative Size -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009 -0.015
[0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.034] [0.037] [0.036]
Log Target MVE -0.005 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.005
[0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
Target BVE/MVE 0.016 0.004 -0.011 -0.018 -0.013 -0.006 -0.020
[0.034] [0.033] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035] [0.036] [0.037]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.011 0.006 0.017 0.022 0.009 0.036 0.024
[0.053] [0.054] [0.055] [0.058] [0.054] [0.056] [0.059]
Target Idio. Volatility 1.103 1.378 1.669 1.894 0.773 1.332 1.279
[1.401] [1.397] [1.366] [1.455] [1.467] [1.391] [1.481]
Bidder Idio. Volatility 1.024 0.961 1.333 1.765 1.646 1.854 1.735
[1.820] [1.817] [1.914] [2.005] [1.897] [1.927] [2.027]
Toehold -0.005 -0.006∗ -0.006∗ -0.006∗ -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
High-tech Target Dummy 0.032 0.024 0.037 0.014 0.046 0.047 0.026
[0.046] [0.045] [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.050]
Same-Industry Dummy -0.080∗ -0.070 -0.121∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
[0.045] [0.044] [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047] [0.049]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.001 0.013 0.012 0.005 0.028 0.017 0.024
[0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.049] [0.047] [0.047] [0.049]
Tender-Offer Dummy -0.211∗∗ -0.203∗∗ -0.151∗ -0.148 -0.146∗ -0.171∗ -0.161∗
[0.085] [0.082] [0.087] [0.090] [0.088] [0.089] [0.093]
Wave Dummy -0.030 -0.033 -0.024 0.001 -0.030 -0.029 -0.008
[0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
Constant 0.751∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.086 0.065 0.156 0.102 0.130
[0.154] [0.154] [0.543] [0.547] [0.525] [0.538] [0.542]
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,104 1,103 978 907 961 939 876
Adjusted R-squared 0.030 0.033 0.038 0.041 0.031 0.036 0.039
†: Results are robust to the use of Heckman selection model in the place of the censored Tobit model.
‡: Deal Surplus is measured differently in each specification. Please refer text on top of table 6.4 Panel C for a
description.
Panel E




1 2 3 4 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Target Runup 6.33% 5.90% 3.33% 1.72% 5.27% 3.58% 1.77%
Fraction of Premium
Anticipated
3.59% 5.12% 4.67% 4.10% 2.93% 3.52% 2.66%
Table 6.5: Target Runup and Bidder Outcome
Panel A presents the mean and median bidder gain in completed deals sorted into terciles based on the level of target runup. Panel
B contains the results from the regression of bidder gain on target runup and controls. The dependent variable (bidder gain) in
models (1) through (6) is measured as follows: model (1) & (2) - Bidder CAR (-1,+1), model (3) & (4) - Bidder CAR (-1,+42)
and model (5) & (6) - Bidder BHAR (-42,+42). The estimates presented are from the Heckman 2-stage selection model to allow
for selection into the “Completed Deal” category. The coefficients of the selection equation are not presented but the coefficient
on the Inverse-Mill’s ratio (Mill’s Lambda) is provided. The target/bidder BHAR is constructed per measure 3 as described in the
appendix. Industry return is the median market-adjusted return of firms in the same 2-digit SIC as the target. See the appendix
for a description of the other control variables used in Panel B. In panel B the value presented in the parenthesis is the standard
error of the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All





1 2 3 (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
Bidder Runup (-42,-2)
Mean -0.007 0.016∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.056 0.000 0.000
Median -0.019∗∗ 0.008 0.037∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003 0.000
N 420 424 423
Bidder Match Firm Runup (-42,-2)
Matching: Industry, Size, B/M & ROA
Mean -0.017∗∗∗ -0.007 0.005 0.188 0.092 0.007
Median -0.027∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.000
N 387 377 387
Industry Abnormal Return
Mean -0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.013∗∗∗ 0.022 0.014 0.000
Median -0.008∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗∗ 0.037 0.330 0.000
N 443 443 442
Bidder Ann. Return (-1,+1)
Mean -0.021∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.050 0.565 0.150
Median -0.019∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.098 0.891 0.098
N 420 424 424
Bidder Ann. Return (-1,+42)
Mean -0.028∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.003 0.015 0.718 0.039
Median -0.027∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.018 0.130 0.582 0.491
N 420 424 422
Bidder Total Gain (-42,+42)
Mean -0.027∗∗∗ 0.005 0.069∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.000
Median -0.033∗∗∗ 0.002 0.038∗∗∗ 0.000 0.409 0.000
N 420 424 422
Panel B
Bidder Ann. CAR Bidder Ann. CAR Bidder BHAR
(-1,1) (-1,42) (-42,42)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-Cash Dummy 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.025 0.020 -0.006 -0.012
[0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.018] [0.024] [0.024]
Percent Stock Offered -0.014 -0.016 -0.005 -0.027 0.000 -0.008
[0.012] [0.012] [0.028] [0.027] [0.036] [0.037]
Target Runup 0.030∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
[0.012] [0.028] [0.041]
Pos.Target Runup Dummy 0.014∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(=1 if Target Runup >0) [0.005] [0.012] [0.017]
Target Ann. Return 0.141∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
[0.047] [0.047]
Bidder Runup -0.022∗ -0.019 -0.054∗ -0.016
[0.013] [0.013] [0.030] [0.030]
Industry Abn. Return 0.019 0.016 0.224∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
[0.034] [0.033] [0.077] [0.077] [0.104] [0.107]
Relative Size -0.006 -0.004 0.010 0.018 0.068∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.008] [0.019] [0.019] [0.024] [0.024]
Log Target MVE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
Target BVE/MVE -0.005 -0.004 -0.025∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.011] [0.015] [0.015]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.002 -0.002 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.007] [0.016] [0.016] [0.022] [0.023]
High Target Idio. Volatility -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.019]
High Bidder Idio. Volatility 0.003 0.003 -0.022 -0.014 0.021 0.023
(=1 if Idio. Vol. > median) [0.006] [0.006] [0.015] [0.014] [0.020] [0.020]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.011∗ -0.010∗ -0.020 -0.017 -0.004 -0.002
[0.006] [0.006] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.020]
Same-Industry Dummy -0.010 -0.011 0.013 0.003 -0.012 -0.013
[0.008] [0.009] [0.019] [0.020] [0.026] [0.027]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.020 -0.014 -0.058 -0.024 0.020 0.038
[0.029] [0.029] [0.066] [0.067] [0.089] [0.091]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.014 0.013 0.010 -0.004 -0.024 -0.026
[0.013] [0.013] [0.030] [0.031] [0.037] [0.039]
Wave Dummy -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.021 -0.021
[0.004] [0.004] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.015]
Constant 0.118 0.122 0.107 0.145 -0.115 -0.072
[0.079] [0.078] [0.112] [0.114] [0.248] [0.252]
Mill’s Lambda 0.034 0.025 0.047 -0.006 -0.090 -0.121
[0.039] [0.040] [0.092] [0.093] [0.118] [0.121]
Uncensored Observations 1,177 1,177 1,177 1,177 1,177 1,177
Wald Chi-squared Statistic 228.04∗∗∗ 233.15∗∗∗ 111.89∗∗∗ 119.44∗∗∗ 231.17∗∗∗ 205.27∗∗∗
Table 6.6: Interaction of Target Runup with Uncertainty Measures
The table presents the results from a Heckman 2-stage selection model (selection into “Completed Deal” category) .The dependent variable
is the bidder’s deal-related gain (Models (1) through (4): Bidder CAR (-1,+1), Models (5) through (8): Bidder CAR (-1,+42)). The
coefficients of the selection equation are not presented but the coefficient on the Inverse-Mill’s ratio (Mill’s Lambda) is provided. In
models (1) and (5) the target runup is interacted with the percentage of stock offered in the deal. Models (2) & (6), (3) & (7), (4)
& (8) respectively present the coefficients for the sub-sample of deals financed fully with cash, mostly with stock and fully with stock.
The target/bidder runup is measured over the (-42, -2) window as per measure 3 described in the appendix. The value presented in the
parenthesis is the standard error of the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively. All interaction terms in regressions are mean centered.
Panel A: Interaction of Target Runup with Mode of Payment























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All-Cash Dummy 0.018∗∗ 0.023
[0.008] [0.018]
Percent Stock Offered -0.016 -0.003 -0.003 -0.070
[0.011] [0.024] [0.027] [0.061]
Target Runup 0.031∗∗∗ 0.006 0.045∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.041 0.003 0.098∗ 0.086∗∗
[0.012] [0.025] [0.022] [0.022] [0.027] [0.046] [0.055] [0.053]
Target Runup * 0.047∗∗ 0.110∗∗
Percent Stock Offered [0.023] [0.053]
Bidder runup -0.033∗∗ 0.003 -0.006 0.013 -0.042 -0.122∗ 0.016 0.036
[0.013] [0.037] [0.020] [0.023] [0.031] [0.069] [0.051] [0.055]
Industry Abn. Return 0.029 -0.069 0.052 0.105∗ 0.233∗∗∗ -0.065 0.267∗∗ 0.284∗
[0.034] [0.085] [0.048] [0.062] [0.078] [0.158] [0.124] [0.147]
Relative Size -0.003 0.056∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ 0.011 0.056∗ -0.053 -0.066
[0.008] [0.017] [0.017] [0.021] [0.019] [0.033] [0.043] [0.050]
Log Target MVE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008]
Target BVE/MVE -0.003 -0.010 -0.017∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.025 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗
[0.005] [0.012] [0.007] [0.009] [0.011] [0.022] [0.019] [0.021]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.005 -0.000 0.013 0.020 -0.041∗∗ -0.008 -0.066∗∗ -0.079∗∗
[0.007] [0.015] [0.011] [0.013] [0.016] [0.029] [0.029] [0.032]
High Target Idio. Vol. -0.021∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.017∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.034 -0.044∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.006] [0.013] [0.009] [0.011] [0.014] [0.023] [0.024] [0.027]
High Bidder Idio. Vol, -0.001 0.024∗ -0.015 -0.000 -0.023 -0.017 -0.030 -0.012
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.006] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011] [0.015] [0.024] [0.025] [0.027]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.019∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.017∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.017 0.006
[0.005] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.012] [0.018] [0.019] [0.023]
Same-Industry Dummy 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.020 -0.008 0.018 -0.055 -0.027
[0.008] [0.012] [0.018] [0.016] [0.019] [0.023] [0.046] [0.037]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.028 0.048 -0.004 -0.004 -0.075 -0.080 -0.177 0.136
[0.028] [0.045] [0.080] [0.097] [0.067] [0.091] [0.195] [0.226]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.015 -0.016 -0.005 0.046 0.016 -0.008 0.013 -0.047
[0.013] [0.015] [0.025] [0.042] [0.030] [0.028] [0.064] [0.098]
Wave Dummy 0.002 0.016∗ -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.001
[0.004] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] [0.017] [0.019] [0.021]
Constant 0.045∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.100 0.219∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.037] [0.029] [0.025] [0.048] [0.069] [0.075] [0.059]
Mill’s Lambda 0.041 -0.082∗ 0.069 0.076 0.073 0.079 0.217 0.134
[0.038] [0.049] [0.070] [0.059] [0.091] [0.098] [0.173] [0.141]
Uncensored Observations 1,175 313 589 419 1,175 313 589 419
Wald Chi-square Statistic 187.11∗∗∗ 33.02∗∗∗ 74.50∗∗∗ 67.05∗∗∗ 71.69∗∗∗ 37.20∗∗∗ 38.48∗∗∗ 43.21∗∗∗
Panel B: Interaction of Target Runup with Alternative Uncertainty Measures
The table presents the results from a Heckman 2-stage selection model (selection into “Completed Deal”
category). The dependent variable is the bidder’s deal-related gain (Models (1) through (4): Bidder CAR
(-1,+1), Models (5) through (8): Bidder CAR (-1,+42)). The coefficients of the selection equation are not
presented but the coefficient on the Inverse-Mill’s ratio (Mill’s Lambda) is provided. In each model the
target runup is interacted with one of the alternative measures of uncertainty (i) High target idiosyncratic
volatility dummy, (ii) Target BVE/MVE, (iii) High-technology target dummy, (iv) Same-industry deal
dummy. All interaction terms are mean-centered. The expected sign on the coefficients of the interaction
terms is outlined in Table 6.1 Panel B. The target/bidder is measured over the (-42,-2) window as per
measure 3 described in the appendix. See the appendix for a description of the other control variables.
The value presented in the parenthesis is the standard error of the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the
coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel B (cont’d)
Bidder CAR (-1,+1) Bidder CAR (-1,+42)
Interaction of Idio. Techn. Industry Idio. Techn. Industry
Target Runup with: Volatility B/M Intensity RelatednessVolatility B/M Intensity Relatedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All-Cash Dummy 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.023
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Percent Stock Offered -0.014 -0.013 -0.019 -0.013 -0.013 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008
[0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Target Runup 0.021 0.035∗∗∗ 0.001 0.039∗∗∗ -0.011 0.054∗ 0.004 0.041
[0.017] [0.012] [0.017] [0.014] [0.038] [0.028] [0.041] [0.031]
Bidder runup -0.033∗∗ -0.026∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.044 -0.029 -0.036 -0.045
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.030] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031]
Industry Abn. Return 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.035 0.250∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
[0.033] [0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.076] [0.079] [0.078] [0.078]
Relative Size -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.009
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Log Target MVE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Target BVE/MVE -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.034∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
High Target Idio. Vol. -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.031∗∗
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
High Bidder Idio. Vol. -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.023 -0.022 -0.024∗ -0.026∗
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.025∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011]
Same-Industry Dummy 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.013 -0.016
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
Target Runup * 0.040∗∗ 0.092∗∗
High Target Idio. Vol. [0.020] [0.045]
Target Runup * -0.030∗∗ -0.069∗∗
Target BVE/MVE [0.013] [0.029]
Target Runup * 0.048∗∗ 0.066∗∗
High-techn target [0.020] [0.034]
Target Runup * -0.054∗∗ -0.055
Same-industry deal [0.030] [0.068]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.030 -0.025 -0.017 -0.029 -0.045 -0.078 -0.065 -0.061
[0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.065] [0.066] [0.066] [0.064]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.018 -0.000 0.019 0.013 0.014
[0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029]
Wave Dummy 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Constant 0.047∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047]
Mill’s Lambda 0.044 0.042 0.025 0.048 0.031 0.086 0.065 0.061
[0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.089] [0.088] [0.089] [0.087]
Uncensored Observations 1,173 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,173 1,175 1,175 1,175
Wald Chi-square Statistic 194.33∗∗∗ 179.54∗∗∗ 192.34∗∗∗ 179.69∗∗∗ 79.06∗∗∗ 64.00∗∗∗ 72.26∗∗∗ 75.45∗∗∗
Panel C: Interaction of Target Runup with Low/Medium/High Uncertainty
Categories
The table presents the results from a Heckman 2-stage selection model (selection into “Completed Deal”
category). The dependent variable is the bidder’s deal-related gain (Models (1) through (4): Bidder CAR
(-1,+1), Models (5) through (8): Bidder CAR (-1,+42)). The coefficients of the selection equation are not
presented but the coefficient on the Inverse-Mill’s ratio (Mill’s Lambda) is provided. Deals are assigned
to low, medium or high uncertainty categories by adding up their scores for each of the five uncertainty
measures: Mode of payment (=1 if % stock > 0.5), Target Idio. Volatility (=0 if target idio. volatility
> Median), Target BVE/MVE (=1 if target BVE/MVE < Median), Target technology intensity (=1
if target is technology intensive) and Target industry relatedness (=1 if target is from the same 2-digit
SIC code). The low uncertainty category consists of deal with an uncertainty score of 1 or less, the
medium uncertainty category consists of deals with an uncertainty score of 2 or 3. The high uncertainty
category includes deals with an uncertainty score of 4 or 5. The target/bidder runup is measured over
the (-42, -2) window as per measure 3 described in the appendix. See the appendix for a description
of the other control variables. The value presented in the parenthesis is the standard error of the co-
efficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel C (cont’d)








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All-Cash Dummy 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.113∗ 0.017 0.009 -0.005
[0.010] [0.011] [0.066] [0.022] [0.028] [0.183]
Percent Stock Offered -0.016 -0.017 0.060 -0.030 -0.048 -0.080
[0.019] [0.017] [0.047] [0.042] [0.042] [0.129]
Target Runup 0.020 0.005 0.018 0.062∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.021 0.008 0.142∗∗
[0.020] [0.019] [0.016] [0.026] [0.026] [0.041] [0.040] [0.070]
Bidder runup -0.027∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.022 0.017 -0.041 -0.119∗ -0.018 0.001
[0.014] [0.028] [0.017] [0.030] [0.031] [0.061] [0.045] [0.085]
Industry Abnormal Return 0.020 0.040 0.025 0.003 0.199∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.035 0.351
[0.037] [0.065] [0.051] [0.084] [0.078] [0.142] [0.131] [0.235]
Relative Size -0.014∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.062∗∗∗ 0.004 0.045∗∗ 0.043 -0.081
[0.007] [0.009] [0.015] [0.021] [0.015] [0.019] [0.036] [0.061]
Log Target MVE -0.005∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.013]
Medium Uncertainty -0.018∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(=1 if 2≤Unc.Score≤3) [0.005] [0.012]
High Uncertainty -0.043∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(=1 if 4≤Unc.Score≤5) [0.008] [0.017]
Target Runup * 0.010 0.045
Medium Uncertainty [0.023] [0.054]
Target Runup * 0.057∗∗ 0.138∗∗
High Uncertainty [0.028] [0.066]
Target BVE/MVE -0.005 -0.002 -0.031 -0.013 -0.038∗∗ -0.100∗
[0.010] [0.007] [0.020] [0.021] [0.018] [0.055]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.012 -0.005 0.027 -0.027 -0.027 0.028
[0.011] [0.011] [0.022] [0.024] [0.027] [0.061]
High Target Idio. Vol. -0.013 -0.022∗∗ 0.000 -0.014 -0.039∗ 0.053
(=1 if Idio. Vol. > median) [0.013] [0.009] [0.031] [0.029] [0.024] [0.084]
High Bidder Idio. Vol. 0.015 -0.002 -0.029∗ -0.021 -0.009 -0.021
(=1 if Idio. Vol. > median) [0.010] [0.009] [0.017] [0.022] [0.023] [0.048]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.017 -0.017∗∗ -0.079∗ -0.031 -0.013 0.071
[0.011] [0.007] [0.044] [0.023] [0.019] [0.120]
Same-Industry Dummy -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.011 -0.038 0.064
[0.015] [0.012] [0.018] [0.033] [0.031] [0.052]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.054∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.033 -0.062 0.007 0.050
[0.021] [0.030] [0.050] [0.046] [0.066] [0.121]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.035∗∗∗ 0.009 0.010 0.044 0.013 -0.024 -0.048 -0.015
[0.008] [0.016] [0.019] [0.035] [0.016] [0.036] [0.046] [0.098]
Wave Dummy -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 0.011 -0.010 -0.005 -0.016 0.030
[0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.013] [0.010] [0.016] [0.016] [0.036]
Constant 0.009 0.054∗ 0.061∗ 0.055 0.045 0.187∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ -0.115
[0.013] [0.033] [0.035] [0.082] [0.029] [0.072] [0.086] [0.228]
Mill’s Lambda 0.078∗∗∗ 0.033 0.020 0.066 0.036 -0.062 -0.158 0.231∗∗
[0.021] [0.042] [0.061] [0.041] [0.047] [0.093] [0.146] [0.113]
Uncensored Observation 1,175 181 635 364 1,175 181 635 364
Wald Chi-square Statistic 143.47∗∗∗ 48.23∗∗∗ 53.68∗∗∗ 14.37 34.34∗∗∗ 24.59∗ 42.34∗∗∗ 11.56
Table 6.7: Uncertainty and Unanticipated Target Premium
Panel A of this table presents mean and median unanticipated premium for deal sub-samples sorted by the different uncer-
tainty measures. Panel B presents the results from OLS regression of the unanticipated premium on the low/medium/high
uncertainty categories. The unanticipated premium is measured as 1 - anticipated premium where the anticipated premium
is measured as:
Ln(Target Price (-2)/Target Price (-42))
Ln(Offer Price/Target Price (-42))
. The anticipated premium is censored at -1 and +1. Deals are
assigned in into low, medium or high uncertainty categories by adding up their scores for each of the five uncertainty measures
Mode of payment (=1 if % stock > 0.5), Target Idio. Volatility (=0 if target idio. volatility > Median), Target BVE/MVE
(=1 if target BVE/MVE < Median), Target technology intensity (=1 if target is technology intensive) and Target industry
relatedness (=1 if target is from the same 2-digit SIC code). The low uncertainty category consists of deal with an uncertainty
score of 1 or less, the medium uncertainty category consists of deals with an uncertainty score of 2 or 3. The high uncertainty
category includes deals with an uncertainty score of 4 or 5. See the appendix for a description of the other control variables.
In panel B, the value presented in the parenthesis is the standard error of the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the
coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A
Unanticipated Target Premium = 1 - Anticipated Target Premium
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (3)-(1)
All Cash All Stock
Mean 0.835 0.685 0.000
Median 0.796 0.581 0.000
N 344 452
Low Target Idio. Vol. High Target Idio. Vol.
Mean 0.807 0.704 0.000
Median 0.737 0.629 0.001
N 727 447
High Target BVEMVE Low Target
BVE
MVE
Mean 0.780 0.753 0.344
Median 0.730 0.686 0.077
N 549 703
Low Tech. Int. High Tech. Int.
Mean 0.791 0.740 0.066
Median 0.726 0.685 0.048
N 583 452
Same Ind. Deal Cross Ind. Deal
Mean 0.773 0.717 0.127
Median 0.707 0.661 0.331
N 1051 1051
Low Uncertainty Med. Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Mean 0.813 0.781 0.627 0.304 0.001 0.000
Median 0.758 0.706 0.538 0.075 0.000 0.000
N 389 606 167
Panel B
Unanticipated Target Premium
= 1 - Anticipated Target Premium
(1) (2)
Medium Uncertainty -0.019 -0.022
(=1 if 2≤Uncertainty Score≤3) [0.032] [0.035]
High Uncertainty -0.156∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(=1 if 4≤Uncertainty Score≤5) [0.047] [0.053]
Industry Abnormal Return -0.968∗∗∗ -0.951∗∗∗
[0.210] [0.217]
Relative Size -0.047 -0.043
[0.034] [0.036]
Log Target MVE 0.013∗ 0.012
[0.009] [0.009]
Hostile-Deal Dummy 0.167∗ 0.183∗
[0.093] [0.095]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.044 0.035
[0.035] [0.038]




Industry Dummy No Yes
Observations 1,121 1,121
R-squared 0.040 0.056
Table 6.8: Impact of Target Runup on Deal Completion
The table presents the average marginal effects from a logistic regression of deal completion (=1 if
deal is completed and 0 if deal is withdrawn) on the target and bidder runup, target and bidder
announcement return and other controls. All continuous variables are standardized so that the
coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the independent
variable on the likelihood of deal completion. The coefficients presented in models (2) through (4)
are from second stage of logit regressions. In the first stage the following Probit model is estimated
to allow for selection into the group (All Cash, Majority Stock & All Stock).
Y = α+ β1Target Runup + β2Bidder Runup + β3Industry Abn. Return (-42,-2)










+ β8Target Idio. Volatility + β9Target Idio. Volatility
+ β10High-Techn Target + β11Same-Industry Deal + β12Hostile Deal Dummy
+ β13Tender Offer Dummy + β14 ∗Wave Dummy + 
where, Y = 1 for the selection group of interest (All Cash, Majority Stock and All Stock). The
estimates from the 1st stage are included to calculate the Inverse-Mill’s ratio, which is used as
a control in the 2nd stage Logit regressions. In panel B deals are assigned in into low, medium
or high uncertainty categories by adding up their scores for each of the five uncertainty measures
Mode of payment (=1 if % stock > 0.5), Target Idio. Volatility (=0 if target idio. volatility >
Median), Target BVE/MVE (=1 if target BVE/MVE < Median), Target technology intensity (=1
if target is technology intensive) and Target industry relatedness (=1 if target is from the same
2-digit SIC code). The low uncertainty category consists of deal with an uncertainty score of 1 or
less, the medium uncertainty category consists of deals with an uncertainty score of 2 or 3. The high
uncertainty category includes deals with an uncertainty score of 4 or 5. The runup, announcement
and post-announcement return of the target/bidder are all measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal
return over following windows (t, t+i) surrounding the announcement of a deal: Runup window (-42,
-2), announcement return window (-1,1), post-announcement window (+2,+42). The target/bidder
BHAR is constructed per measure 3 described in the appendix. See the appendix for a description
of the other control variables. The value presented in the parenthesis is the standard error of the
coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%






% Stock > 0.5
All Stock
Deals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All-Stock Dummy 0.071∗∗∗ -0.044
[0.020] [0.033]
Percent Cash Offered 0.021∗ -0.080
[0.011] [0.058]
Target Runup 0.014 0.021 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗
[0.012] [0.014] [0.015] [0.018]
Bidder Runup -0.002 0.050∗ 0.001 -0.004
[0.009] [0.026] [0.014] [0.018]
Target Ann. Return 0.039∗∗∗ 0.009 0.036∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
[0.010] [0.016] [0.013] [0.017]
Bidder Ann. Return 0.002 0.029 0.004 0.001
[0.008] [0.019] [0.011] [0.012]
Target Post Ann. Return 0.096∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
[0.010] [0.021] [0.018] [0.023]
Bidder Post Ann. Return 0.003 0.036∗ -0.010 -0.007
[0.010] [0.019] [0.019] [0.025]
Target Runup × 0.036∗∗
Percent Stock Offered [0.018]
Industry Abn. Return (-42,-2) 0.014 0.018 0.003 0.010
[0.009] [0.019] [0.011] [0.014]
Relative Size -0.028∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.025] [0.012] [0.018]
Log Target MVE 0.047∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.027 0.027
[0.012] [0.029] [0.026] [0.026]
Target BVE/MVE 0.005 -0.028 0.003 0.017
[0.010] [0.029] [0.017] [0.024]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.012 -0.092∗∗∗ 0.009 0.019
[0.009] [0.032] [0.022] [0.024]
Target Idio. Volatility 0.029∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.010
[0.014] [0.032] [0.021] [0.026]
Bidder Idio. Volatility -0.005 0.140∗∗ 0.003 0.003
[0.012] [0.055] [0.030] [0.039]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.052∗∗ 0.016 -0.017 -0.034
[0.022] [0.042] [0.027] [0.034]
Same-Industry Dummy 0.050∗∗ -0.005 0.104∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗
[0.023] [0.034] [0.036] [0.044]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.482∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗
[0.061] [0.071] [0.146]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.149∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ 0.082
[0.017] [0.016] [0.124]
Low Target Price Dummy 0.039∗ -0.070 0.034 0.039
(=1 if Target Price (-42)<=$5) [0.023] [0.068] [0.036] [0.047]
Mill’s Ratio 0.532∗∗∗ -0.066 -0.116
[0.174] [0.128] [0.139]
Observations 1,437 359 697 477
Pseudo R-Squared 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.21











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target Runup 0.004 0.001 0.029∗∗ 0.052∗∗
[0.015] [0.016] [0.013] [0.021]
Bidder runup 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.009
[0.009] [0.021] [0.013] [0.018]
Target Ann. Return 0.054∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.030
[0.010] [0.017] [0.014] [0.021]
Bidder Ann. Return -0.004 0.018 -0.001 -0.018
[0.008] [0.015] [0.012] [0.015]
Target Post Ann. Return 0.088∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.023] [0.019] [0.018]
Bidder Post Ann.Return 0.003 0.032∗ 0.009 -0.066∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.019] [0.017] [0.016]
Industry Abn. Return (-42,-2) 0.012 0.009 0.024∗ 0.007
[0.009] [0.019] [0.013] [0.014]
Medium Uncertainty 0.003
(=1 if 2≤Unc.Score≤3) [0.021]
High Uncertainty 0.043
(=1 if 4≤Unc.Score≤ 5) [0.031]
Target Runup × 0.018
Medium Uncertainty [0.020]
Target Runup × 0.047∗∗
High Uncertainty [0.023]
Relative Size -0.032∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.008
[0.008] [0.015] [0.011] [0.030]
Log Target MVE 0.040∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.051∗∗∗ 0.033
[0.012] [0.019] [0.017] [0.027]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.524∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗ -0.496∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.070] [0.091]
Tender-Offer Dummy 0.141∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗
[0.017] [0.025] [0.032]
Low Target Price Dummy 0.050∗∗ -0.055 0.064∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(=1 if Target Price (-42)<=$5) [0.023] [0.057] [0.031] [0.043]
Observations 1455 481 769 198
Pseudo R-Squared 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.38
Uncond. Withdrawal Likelihood 17.4% 21.4% 19.1% 17.7%
†: Completed=1, Withdrawn=0.
Table 6.9: Target Runup and Bidder Uncertainty Change around Deal Announcement
Panel A contains the summary statistics on the change in the bidder and the portfolio implied volatil-
ity around deal announcement. Panel B contains the results from the OLS regression of bidder (portfolio)
implied volatility change on target runup and other controls. The dependent variable in models (1)
through (4) is the change in the bidder implied volatility. The dependent variable in models (5) through
(8) is the change in the portfolio implied volatility. In models (1) and (4) I interact the target runup with
the percentage of stock offered in the deal. Models (2) & (6), (3) & (7), (4) & (8) respectively present the
coefficients for the sub-sample of deals financed fully with cash, mostly with stock and fully with stock.
All interaction terms in regressions are mean centered.
The percentage change in bidder (portfolio) implied volatility is measured as the change in bidder im-
plied volatility scaled by the bidder implied volatility long prior to deal announcement (-83,-63).
∆Bidder Impl. Vol. =Bidder Implied Volatility0,5 − Bidder Implied Volatility−83,−63
where Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility0,5 is the median of the implied volatility of the 91-day at-the-
money option of the bidder (target) stock over a 5-day window following the announcement of the deal.
Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility−83,−63 likewise with a 21-days window.
∆Portfolio Impl. Vol. =Bidder Impl. Vol.0,5 − Bidder Impl. Vol.−1 − Bidder Impl. Vol.−83,−63
+
[
(W 2Bidder × Bidder Impl. Vol.2) + (W 2Target × Target Impl. Vol.2)
+ 2×WBidder ×WTarget × Corr(Bidder,Target)× Bidder Impl.Vol.
× Target Impl.Vol.]0.5
where W Bidder = Target MVE−42/(Bidder MVE−42 + Target MVE−42) and W Target = 1 − WBidder.
Correl (Bidder,Target) is the correlation between the bidder and target return over a 21-day window
starting 83-days prior to deal announcement. Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility1 is the bidder implied
volatility 1-day prior to deal announcement.
The target/bidder BHAR is constructed per measure 3 as described in the appendix. See appendix
for a description of control variables. In panel B, the standard error of the coefficient is in parenthesis.












Percent change in bidder
implied volatility
Mean 1.57∗∗∗ 0.04 2.05∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗
Median -1.29 -1.75 -0.67 -0.667
N 821 205 440 286
Percent change in portfolio
implied volatility
Mean 7.89∗∗∗ 5.73∗∗∗ 8.60∗∗∗ 9.33∗∗∗
Median 6.34∗∗∗ 5.31∗∗∗ 7.02∗∗∗ 7.85∗∗∗
N 487 99 273 141
Panel B
Pct. Change in Bidder Impl. Volatility Pct. Change in Portfolio Impl. Volatility













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Cash Dummy -0.013 -0.007
[0.018] [0.020]
% Stock Offered 0.001 0.013
[0.019] [0.024]
Target Runup -0.035∗ -0.017 -0.049∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.036 0.098 -0.107∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.045] [0.020] [0.034] [0.036] [0.032] [0.032] [0.036]
Target Runup × -0.090∗∗ -0.120∗
% Stock Offered [0.044] [0.070]
Relative size 0.031∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.026 0.044∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
[0.014] [0.008] [0.017] [0.021] [0.012] [0.023] [0.015] [0.018]
Log Target MVE -0.011 -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015
-
0.036∗∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009]
Target BVE/MVE -0.033∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.021 -0.004 0.003 -0.085
[0.016] [0.026] [0.026] [0.033] [0.029] [0.048] [0.054]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.032 -0.033 -0.054 -0.015 -0.039 -0.083 -0.019 -0.040
[0.023] [0.037] [0.041] [0.045] [0.030] [0.030] [0.046]
Target Idio.Volatility -1.000∗∗∗ -1.651∗∗ -0.742** -0.453 0.061 -0.387 -0.176 -0.916
[0.318] [0.689] [0.415] [0.433] [0.450] [0.596] [1.168] [0.580]
Same industry dummy -0.010 -0.022 -0.009 0.009 -0.049∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.058 -0.048∗
[0.012] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.015] [0.032] [0.023] [0.028]
Hostile deal dummy -0.001 -0.133∗∗∗ 0.033 0.054 0.016 0.070
[0.038] [0.020] [0.092] [0.060] [0.031] [0.085]
Tender offer dummy -0.003 -0.032∗ -0.053 -0.073∗∗ 0.013 0.011 0.063 -0.005
[0.015] [0.018] [0.055] [0.032] [0.015] [0.015] [0.060] [0.016]
High-tech target
dummy
0.012 -0.030 0.018 0.020 0.019 -0.000 0.046∗∗ 0.048
[0.012] [0.021] [0.018] [0.021] [0.014] [0.021] [0.022] [0.032]
Constant 0.082∗ 0.106 0.028 -0.019 0.140 ∗∗ 0.152 0.179 0.393∗∗∗
[0.044] [0.074] [0.058] [0.07] [0.066] [0.108] [0.182] [0.100]
Observations 727 187 387 242 392 97 215 135
R-squared 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.071 0.161 0.058 0.077
Table 6.10: Impact of Industry and Macro Level Factors
The table presents the results from the OLS regression of the bidder announcement return (-1,+42) on target runup and
other controls. The estimation in models (1) and (2) are for sub-samples sorted by industry abnormal return. In models (3)
and (4) deals are sorted into “Non Wave” and “Wave” groups. A deal is defined as being part of a merger wave if it happens
in an year where the number of deals in the industry (using Fama Frech 49 industry classification) lies in the top quartile
of the distribution of deals in the industry. Deals are sorted based on the Industry BVE/MVE in models (5) and (6). The
target/bidder runup is measured as the BHAR over the (-42, -2) window as per measure 3 described in the appendix. See
the appendix for a description of the other control variables. The value presented in the parenthesis is the standard error of
the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All
interaction terms in regressions are mean centered.
Bidder Ann. CAR (-1,+42)
Industry Abn. Return Merger Wave Industry. BVE/MVE
< Median > Median No Yes < Median > Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-Cash Dummy 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.028 0.036 0.013
[0.023] [0.021] [0.019] [0.026] [0.024] [0.020]
Percent Stock Offered -0.030 -0.002 -0.019 -0.014 -0.004 -0.025
[0.025] [0.022] [0.021] [0.029] [0.026] [0.021]
Target Runup 0.067∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.030 0.062∗∗ 0.045
[0.034] [0.032] [0.030] [0.038] [0.031] [0.032]
Bidder Runup -0.114∗∗ 0.039 -0.102∗∗ 0.075 -0.063 0.016
[0.045] [0.040] [0.050] [0.055] [0.039] [0.046]
Industry Abn. Return 0.291∗∗∗ 0.094 0.205∗∗ 0.177
[0.110] [0.105] [0.100] [0.118]
Relative Size 0.030∗ -0.003 0.023 0.010 0.025 0.032∗
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.025] [0.019] [0.018]
Log Target MVE -0.022∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Target BVE/MVE -0.024 -0.027∗ -0.009 -0.056∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.046∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.021] [0.016] [0.014]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.033 -0.033 -0.041∗∗ -0.004 -0.073∗∗∗ -0.027
[0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.037] [0.026] [0.020]
High Target Idio. Vol. -0.051∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.033∗ -0.031 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.014
(=1 if Idio. Vol.>median) [0.020] [0.017] [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018]
High Bidder Idio. Vol. -0.032∗ -0.013 -0.022 -0.008 -0.004 -0.048∗∗∗
(=1 if Idio. Vol.>median) [0.019] [0.017] [0.018] [0.021] [0.019] [0.018]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.027∗ -0.024∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.014 -0.038∗∗ -0.005
[0.016] [0.014] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015]
Same-Industry Dummy -0.006 -0.004 0.006 -0.012 0.006 -0.007
[0.020] [0.018] [0.016] [0.021] [0.020] [0.017]
Hostile-Deal Dummy -0.007 -0.046 -0.020 -0.067 0.045 -0.045
[0.045] [0.052] [0.043] [0.062] [0.069] [0.037]
Tender-Offer Dummy -0.020 0.003 -0.018 0.017 -0.004 -0.013
[0.021] [0.020] [0.017] [0.022] [0.022] [0.019]
Wave Dummy -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001
[0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Constant 0.181∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
[0.044] [0.039] [0.036] [0.051] [0.043] [0.040]
Observations 596 571 659 522 617 554
R-squared 0.098 0.064 0.068 0.064 0.075 0.087
Table 6.11: Selected Mode of Payment and the Target Runup & Bidder Outcome Relationship
The table presents the first and second stage results from a Heckman selection model. The dependent variable in the
second stage in models (1) and (3) is the bidder ann. CAR (-1,1). The dependent variable in the second stage in
models (2) and (4) is the bidder BHAR (-1,42). In models (1) and (2) the selection is into the “Majority Cash”(%
Cash >0.5) group and in models (3) and (4) the selection is into the “Majority Stock”(% Stock >0.5)those in the
main equation. The selection equation (first stage) includes 2 additional controls: (i) Low target price dummy and
(ii) Bidder Cash/Assets. The target/bidder runup is measured as the BHAR over (-42, -2) as per measure 3 described
in the appendix. See appendix for a description of the control variables. The value in the parenthesis is the standard
error of the coefficient. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. All interaction terms are mean centered.
Selection into: % Cash >0.5 % Stock >0.5
Bidder Ann. CAR (-1,1) (-1,42) (-1,1) (-1,42)
(1) (2) Selection Eq. (3) (4) Selection Eq.
Target Runup 0.024 0.035 -0.179 0.030∗∗ 0.070∗ 0.144
[0.019] [0.040] [0.195] [0.014] [0.038] [0.203]
Bidder Runup 0.006 -0.075 -0.810∗∗∗ -0.013 0.034 0.775∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.077] [0.272] [0.020] [0.055] [0.269]
Industry Abnormal Ret. -0.013 0.172 0.044 0.049 0.227∗ -0.117
[0.062] [0.128] [0.669] [0.045] [0.123] [0.689]
Relative Size 0.020∗∗ 0.012 -0.098 -0.029∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.002
[0.010] [0.020] [0.105] [0.009] [0.024] [0.113]
Log Target MVE -0.007∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.058∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.012 0.128∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.007] [0.034] [0.003] [0.008] [0.035]
Target BVE/MVE 0.001 0.002 0.141 -0.015∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.041
[0.010] [0.020] [0.091] [0.007] [0.018] [0.092]
Bidder BVE/MVE -0.017 -0.011 -0.036 0.012 -0.117∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.026] [0.135] [0.015] [0.041] [0.139]
High Target Idio. Vol. -0.012 -0.018 -0.306∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.012 0.375∗∗∗
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.014] [0.028] [0.114] [0.011] [0.030] [0.120]
High Bidder Idio. Vol. 0.039∗ -0.008 -0.577∗∗∗ -0.009 0.048 0.715∗∗∗
(=1 if Idio.Vol.> median) [0.021] [0.045] [0.110] [0.017] [0.043] [0.114]
High-tech Target Dummy -0.022∗ -0.057∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.005 0.029
[0.011] [0.024] [0.094] [0.007] [0.019] [0.096]
Same-Industry Dummy 0.010 0.014 -0.007 0.025∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.047
[0.010] [0.019] [0.113] [0.009] [0.024] [0.118]
Hostile-Deal Dummy 0.005 0.021 -0.442∗ 0.055 -0.008 -0.109
[0.023] [0.047] [0.267] [0.055] [0.130] [0.443]
Tender-Offer Dummy -0.057 -0.029 1.538∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.251∗ -2.052∗∗∗
[0.049] [0.108] [0.106] [0.057] [0.145] [0.159]
Wave Dummy -0.000 -0.006 0.080 -0.004 0.007 0.049
[0.008] [0.016] [0.086] [0.007] [0.018] [0.088]
Low Target Price Dummy -0.088 0.037
=1 if Tar. Price(-42)≤ $5 [0.132] [0.136]
Bidder Cash/Assets -0.147 0.610∗∗
[0.244] [0.251]
Constant 0.131∗∗ 0.165 -0.191 0.054 -0.014 -0.711∗∗∗
[0.059] [0.132] [0.247] [0.043] [0.114] [0.251]
Mill’s Lambda -0.067 -0.020 0.008 0.183∗
[0.054] [0.121] [0.037] [0.096]
Uncensored Observations 443 443 443 443
Wald Chi-square Statistic 35.87∗∗∗ 35.54∗∗∗ 68.85∗∗∗ 39.21∗∗∗
Table 6.12: Robustness Check
Panel A presents the difference in (1) the deal surplus and (2) the bidder gain for sub-samples of stock deals (Percentage
stock > 0.5) relative to that of matched cash deals (Percentage cash > 0.5) under scenarios of negative and positive
target runup. The matching process is as follows: For each deal financed mostly with stock (Percentage stock > 0.5),
I match a deal that is financed mostly with cash (Percentage cash > 0.5) using the following restrictions: (i) the deals
should have been announced within 3 years of each other, (ii) the target runup in the cash deal should lie within the
(-20%, +20%) threshold of the target runup in the stock deal, (iii) the size of the bidder in the cash deal must lie within
the (-20%,+20%) threshold of the bidder size in the stock deal. The deal surplus is the weighted average of the target
and the bidder BHAR over the window (-42,+42). The target and the bidder weights are based on the respective
market values of equity 42-days prior to the announcement of the day. The runup, announcement return of the target
(bidder) are all measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal return over following windows (t, t + i) surrounding the
announcement of a deal: Runup window (-42, -2), announcement return window (-1,+1). The target/bidder BHAR
is constructed per measure 3 as described in the appendix. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate that the statistic is different from zero
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Target Runup < 0 (N=200) Target Runup > 0 (N=340)
Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev.
Deal Surplus (1) -0.045∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.157 0.095∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.165
(% stock > 0.5)
Deal Surplus (2) 0.008 0.013 0.112 0.093∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.087
(% cash > 0.5)
Diff. Deal Surplus (1)-(2) -0.054∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ 0.183 0.002 0.006 0.180
Bidder Total Gain (3) -0.061∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ 0.179 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.177
(% stock > 0.5)
Bidder Total Gain (4) -0.015∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.137 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.107
(% cash > 0.5)
Diff. Bidder Total
Gain
(3)-(4) -0.046∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ 0.216 0.005 0.006 0.205
APPENDIX
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Table A1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Runup BHAR (-42, -2)
I construct 5 different measures for each of the above variable:
Measure 1: Πt+it
(
1 + Ri,t − Rf,t
) − Πt+it (1 + αˆi + βˆ1i(RMkt,t − Rf,t) +
βˆ2iRSMB,t + βˆ3iRHML,t + βˆ4iRUMD,t
)
where αˆi, βˆi are the
estimates from the Fama-French 4-factor model over a 252
day window (-294, -43).




Measure 3: Π−2−42(1 + Ri,t − Rf,t) − Π−2−42
(
1 +
RSize and B/M Match Portfolio,t −Rf,t
)
. I sort the targets
/ the bidders into size (Book-to-market) deciles based on
their respective market value of equity (BVE/MVE) values
in the fiscal year that ended just prior the announcement
of the deal. The size and book-to-market cutoff values
are based on NYSE listed stocks (obtained from Kenneth
French’s website). The runup measure is hence the differ-
ence between the buy-and-hold excess return on the target
(or the bidder) and the buy-and-hold excess return on the
size and B/M match portfolio.
Measure 4: Π−2−42(1+Ri,t−Rf,t)−Π−2−42
(
1+R10 Firm Match Portfolio,t
−Rf,t
)
. For each target (bidder) I identify which belong to
the same industry, have a market value of equity between
80% and 120% of the target (the bidder) MVE.I then short-
list a portfolio of 10 firms which are closest in BVE/MVE
to the target (the bidder). he matching is done based on
market value of equity and BVE/MVE values in the year
prior to the announcement of the deal. If 10 firms are not
available in the same 4-digit SIC code and within the size
threshold, I look for potential matches in the same 3-digit





Where, Pi is the target (the bidder) price on day t (=-42 or
-2).
Announcement Return CAR (-1, 1) and CAR(-1, 42) : I construct measures (1) through (5) discussed
above for the announcement window.
Variable Definition
Total Gain BHAR (-42, 42)
I construct measures (1) through (5) discussed above for the (-42, 42) window.
Deal Surplus Measure 1:
Bidder MVE−42×Bidder BHAR (-42, 2)+Target MVE−42×Target BHAR (-42,+42)
Bidder MVE−42+Target MVE−42
In the event that the bidder already has a toehold in the target the weights
are adjusted to account for the toehold.
Alternative Measures:
(Bidder Mkt. Val. Post + Target Mkt. Val. Post) - (Bidder Mkt. Val. Pre + Target Mkt. Val. Pre)
Bidder Mkt. Val. Pre + Target Mkt. Val. Pre
Thee bidder / the target market value Pre is the market value of assets of
the bidder/target 42 days prior to deal announcement. The bidder/target
market value Post is the market value of the bidder/target 42 days, 1 year
and 2 years following the deal announcement. Following the completion of a
deal the target market value is set to zero. Industry adjusted measures are
calculated by subtracting the change in the market value of matched-firms
(matched on industry, size, B/M and ROA) over the same period.
Anticipated Premium
Ln(Target Price (-2)/Target Price (-42))
Ln(Offer Price/Target Price (-42))
Unanticipated
Premium
1 - Anticipated Premium
Deal Value SDC deal value in millions of 2010 dollars.
Relative Size SDC deal value scaled by the bidder market value of equity in the year that
ended just prior to deal announcement.




Target (bidder) book value of equity scaled by target (bidder) market value
of equity.




The standard deviation of the market model residuals. The market model is
Idiosyncratic estimated over the window (-294,-43).
Same Industry If the target and the bidder share one or more 4-digit or 3-digit SIC codes
then
same industry dummy is set equal to 1 and 0 otherwise.
Variable Definition
Toehold Percentage of target stock held by the bidder prior to deal announcement
Hostile Deal Dummy is set equal to 1 if the target stance to the deal is hostile and 0
otherwise.
Tender Offer Dummy is set equal to 1 if the deal is a tender offer and 0 otherwise.
Target (Bidder) Price
Low
Dummy is set equal to 1 if the price of target (bidder) stock 42-days prior to
deal announcement is less than $5 and 0 otherwise.
Industry Abnormal Re-
turn
Market-adjusted median return of all firms in the target’s 2-digit SIC code
over the runup period.
Industry B/M Median BVE/MVE of all firms in the target’s 2-digit SIC code in the calendar
year prior to deal announcement.
Wave Dummy is set equal to one if the deal is announced in an year where the
number of deals in the industry (using Fama French 49 industry classification)
lies in the top quartile of the distribution of deals in the industry.
Change in Bidder
Implied Volatility
=Bidder Implied Volatility0,5 − Bidder Implied Volatility−83,−63.
Bidder Implied Volatility0,5 is the median implied volatility of 91-day Volatil-
ity at-the-money option of the bidder stock over a 5-day window following deal
announcement. Bidder Implied Volatility−83,−63 is the median implied volatil-
ity of 91-day at-the-money option of the bidder stock over a 21-day window
starting 83-days prior to deal announcement.
Change in Portfolio
Volatility
= Bidder Impl. Vol.0,5 - Bidder Impl. Vol.−1 - Bidder Impl. Vol.−83,−63 +[
(W 2Bidder×Bidder Impl. Vol.2) + (W 2Target×Target Impl. Vol.2) + 2×WBidder×
WTarget× Corr(Bidder,Target) × Bidder Impl. Vol. × Target Impl. Vol.
]0.5
where:
WBidder = Target MVE−42/(Bidder MVE−42 + Target MVE−42)
WTarget = 1−WBidder
Corr (Bidder,Target) is the correlation between the bidder and target return
over a 21-day window starting 83-days prior to deal announcement. Bidder
(Target) Implied Volatility−1 is the bidder implied volatility 1-day prior to
deal announcement. Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility0,5 is the median im-
plied volatility of 91-day at-the-money option of the bidder (target) stock over
a 5-day window following deal announcement. Bidder (Target) Implied Volatil-
ity−83,−63 is the median implied volatility of 91-day at-the-money option of
the bidder (target) stock over a 21-day window starting 83-days prior to deal
announcement.
